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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the impact of local house price booms on capital 
misallocation within manufacturing industries. Using the geographic variation provided 
by the salient Spanish housing boom (2003-2007), we show that manufacturing firms 
exposed to positive local house price shocks received more credit from banks and their 
investment grew more intensively when they had a larger proportion of collateralizable 
real estate assets. We exploit the geographical variation in both house prices and pre-
boom urban land supply at municipality level to document that this collateral channel 
was exacerbated for firms located in urban land-constrained geographical areas 
where real estate appreciation was larger. The interaction of geographical conditions, 
that led to heterogeneous housing booms, with the collateral channel on investment 
resulted in an increasing dispersion of the capital-labor ratio within industries. A simple 
counterfactual calculation suggests that the misallocation generated by the collateral 
channel on investment could account for between one-quarter and half of the fall in TFP 
experienced in the Spanish manufacturing sector over the housing boom.
Keywords: housing boom, misallocation, collateral channel, productivity.
JEL classification: E22, E44, O16, 047.
Resumen
En este documento se investiga empíricamente el impacto de la heterogeneidad en el 
incremento de los precios de la vivienda a nivel municipal en la ineficiente asignación 
del capital dentro de las industrias manufactureras. Utilizando el extraordinario boom 
inmobiliario que tuvo lugar en España entre 2003 y 2007, mostramos cómo las empresas 
manufactureras expuestas a mayores shocks locales en los precios inmobiliarios y con una 
mayor proporción de activos inmobiliarios potencialmente colateralizables recibieron más 
crédito por parte del sector bancario, y que su tasa de inversión creció más intensamente. 
Usando la variación geográfica a nivel municipal tanto en los precios de la vivienda como en 
la oferta de suelo urbano previa al boom inmobiliario, documentamos que el canal creado 
por el aumento del valor del colateral fue más potente para las empresas localizadas 
en áreas geográficas con restricciones de suelo disponible donde los incrementos del 
precio de la vivienda fueron mayores. La interacción de las condiciones geográficas 
que conducen a booms inmobiliarios heterogéneos con el impacto de la revalorización del 
valor del colateral en la inversión da como resultado un incremento de la dispersión 
de la ratio capital-trabajo dentro de las industrias manufactureras. Un simple cálculo del 
escenario contrafactual sugiere que la mala asignación de los recursos causada por la 
revaloración del colateral de las empresas podría explicar entre un cuarto y la mitad de 
la caída de la productividad total de los factores experimentada por el sector manufacturero 
español durante el boom inmobiliario. 
Palabras clave: boom inmobiliario, colateral, ineficiencia asignativa, productividad.
Códigos JEL: E22, E44, O16, 047.
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1 Introduction
Productivity growth started to decline before the onset of the global financial crisis of the late
2000s in several advanced economies (Fabina and Wright, 2013, Fernald, 2015). This slowdown
in productivity occurred during an economic expansion period sustained by strong internal de-
mand that in some advanced economies, such as the United States or many European countries,
coincided in time with large increases in house prices and corporate debt. The coincidence of
these remarkable macroeconomic facts underlines the need for a better understanding of the
relationship between house price booms and the dynamics of corporate investment and pro-
ductivity. In this paper, we exploit the salient case of the Spanish housing boom (2003-2007)
to empirically investigate the potential causal effect of house price fluctuations on corporate
investment and credit through the impact of local house price shocks on the collateral value
of firms. Through the identification of this channel, we examine the capacity of heterogeneous
local housing booms to generate capital misallocation within manufacturing industries, and
thereby create aggregate productivity losses in the economy.
Spain is a proper case to examine the link between house prices, credit-funded investment and
productivity dynamics. Indeed, over the first decade of 2000s, Spain experienced a noteworthy
increase of both non-residential investment and corporate credit that coincided in time with a
significant reduction of productivity and an outstanding housing boom.1 In particular, corporate
investment increased by 70% from 2000 to 2007, departing from more moderate investment
expansions in the range of 25%-35% such as the ones registered in the United States or in the
main euro-area economies (OECD, 2018). The notable accumulation of capital by the private
sector in Spain was mainly funded through credit from the banking sector resulting in the surge
of the debt of non-financial institutions from 64% to 124% of GDP between 2000 and 2007. This
corporate credit expansion was possible due to the increasing prominence of loans collateralized
with real estate assets, in a context where house prices raised at a cumulative rate of 120% over
this period (Santos, 2014, Jiménez et al., 2020). This corporate credit boom was not just used
to fund construction and real estate activities but it was spread throughout major sectors of
activity (IMF, 2011). This credit expansion contributed to boost real GDP, which grew at an
average yearly growth of 3.5% over the 2000-2007 period. However, this growth was driven by
the accumulation of factors as indicated by a standard growth accounting decomposition that
shows a decline in total factor productivity (TFP) (Garcia-Santana et al., 2020). According to
the estimates in Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015), Spanish real productivity declined at an
average annual rate of 0.5% between 2000 and 2007, and this fall was also documented within
the manufacturing industry using the EUKLEMS database (Stehrer et al., 2019).2
1See Section 2 for a more detailed discussion on the dynamics of house prices, investment and corporate debt
occurred in Spain during this period.
2The examination of the Spanish productivity dynamics across sectors reveals that its fall over the boom
cannot be exclusively explained by an increase of the relative weight of the construction and real estate sectors
in the economy (IMF, 2011). In particular, according to the IMF estimates less than half of Spain’s productivity
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In order to rationalize the connection between these aggregate developments, we consider
a stylized static partial equilibrium model in which firms with borrowing constraints have a
heterogeneous ability to collateralize their assets. The model serves the purpose to understand
the potential interactions between house prices and firms’ composition of assets that may result
in heterogeneous borrowing capacity and investment rates across firms within an industry. The
predictions of the odel guide our empirical analsysis and rely on two fundamental assumptions.
First, in line with the collateral channel literature (e.g., Chaney, Sraer and Thes ar, 2012), we
postulate that the borrowing capacity of firms depends on the valuation of their real estate
(or housing) assets. Second, consistent with the urban economics literature (Glaeser, Gyourko
and Saiz, 2008, Saiz, 2010), we assume that initial local geographical conditions determine the
housing supply and, thus, the response of local house prices during a housing boom. Given these
assumptions, the odel predicts that, within a manufacturing industry, firms located in geo-
graphically constrained municipalities have the capacity during a housing boom to borrow and
invest more than firms with the same composition of assets but whose collateralizable housing
assets are located in areas with lower geographical constraints. In addition, for firms located in
the same geographical area, the model predicts that the effect of a local housing boom on firms’
borrowing and investment is exacerbated among firms whose collateral is relatively abundant on
housing assets. These predictions relate the heterogeneity of firms’ investment rates with local
housing booms, pointing to the capacity of these booms to create misallocation of resources
within an industry. In line with models à la Hsieh and Klenow (2009), this misallocation is
defined in our framework as an increase of the industry variance in the capital-labor ratio with
respect to the efficient case in which the relative value of firm’s assets does not change. The
size of this capital misallocation measure depends on the heterogeneity of local house price
booms whose relative size amplifies the distortion on investment and credit allocation across
firms within an industry. Lastly, in the model, these measures of misallocation have a direct re-
lation with the productivity in a given industry, so that this collateral channel lead to aggregate
productivity losses during a housing boom.
We test the predictions of our stylized model using a panel of manufacturing firms that were
active during the Spanish housing boom (2003-2007). This panel contains detailed firm-level
information on their financial statements, as well as measures of local house prices during the
housing boom and proxies of housing supply elasticities for Spanish municipalities. Taking into
account our data availability and theoretical predictions, we specify an empirical model that
considers the potential impact on capital accumulation of the interaction between the relative
composition of collateralizable assets of firms and the geographic location of these assets. In a
reduc d-form invest ent quation, we pr xy the relative weight of real estate assets on firms’
total assets by firms’ tangibility rate, meanwhile the impact of geographic conditions on real
estate value is captured by local hous price shocks. Th coeffici nt a so iated to the interacti n
gap with the rest of the Eurozone can be attributed to differences in its sectoral activity composition.
2
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of these two variables measures the differential effect of house prices growth on the investment
rate of firms depending on the tangibility of their collateral. In the presence of financial frictions,
the model predicts a positive sign implying that an increase in local house prices in a municipality
raises the investment rate for the average firm in the sample, and this increase is higher the
larger the tangibility of firm’s assets. This specification also allows us to estimate the house
price elasticity of investment measured as the coefficient associated to the local house price
shocks plus the coefficient associated to the interaction term, the latter being multiplied by the
average share of firm’s tangible assets.
The OLS estimates of our investment equation could be biased because local house prices
shocks can be positively correlated with firms’ investment opportunities, and these house prices
might capture local demand shocks. In order to address the potential endogeneity of local
house prices, we run a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimate of the investment equation where
local house price shocks are instrumented using the pre-boom buildable urban land ratio in a
municipality, that is a proxy of housing supply elasticity, interacted with the aggregate long-
term real interest rate of mortgage loans granted to households by the banking sector. This
empirical strategy has been broadly used in the literature that estimates the real effects of house
price shocks, and it relies on the assumption that, when a housing boom occurs, local geographic
conditions determines the size of the change in house prices at local level, but it is exogenous to
firms’ investment decisions during the boom. For a first assessment of the empirical robustness
of our identification strategy, we provide evidence on several first-stage regressions indicating
the relevance of our instrument and its predictive power on house prices at municipality level.
This identification strategy is also enhanced with the inclusion of a set of industry-location-
time fixed-effects that abstract from location-specific shocks that could affect all firms within
an industry during a given year.
The OLS and 2SLS estimates of the investment equation are consistent with the main
prediction of the model. Our estimates indicate not only that the investment rate of the
average firm increases when local house prices raises, but also that the larger the tangibility of
firm’s assets the higher the increase in investment. The OLS estimates of both the interaction
coefficient and the house price elasticities of investment are lower than the 2SLS ones, consistent
with the expected downward bias in the OLS coefficients. The 2SLS estimates from our preferred
specification point to a house price elasticity of investment for the average firms of 0.13, in a
context of a housing boom where average local house price rises yearly at 14%.3 These results
can be interpreted as a first evidence of capital misallocation through the lens of our model. In
particular, our estimates point to a causal heterogeneous impact of local house price shocks
on the accumulation of capital that depends on firms’ relative composition of assets. For
3In order to put this result in the context of the literature, we consider the main estimate reported in Chaney,
Sraer and Thesmar (2012) that situates the house price - investment elasticity at 6% for the average firm in the
U.S.
3
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instance, given the same local house price shock, manufacturing firms in the 75th percentile
of the distribution of the share of tangible fixed assets invest 98 pp more than manufacturing
firms in the bottom 25th percentile. At the same time, the elasticity of house prices growth
to the investment rate is close to 0 for manufacturing firms with the median tangibility rate
(0.234). This result points out that firms with relatively low tangibility rates could be forced
to cut investment during housing booms in the presence of the collateral channel.
Following the predictions of the model that relate the borrowing capacity of firms with their
collateral value, we also specify a reduced-form credit equation equivalent to the investment
equation but now considering as dependent variable the growth rate of outstanding credit pro-
vided by the banking sector. The OLS and 2SLS estimates of this equation are consistent with
the prediction of the model, that is, firms within an industry located in municipalities that
experience higher house price appreciations receive more banking credit, and the allocation of
credit is positively related with the tangibility of their collateral. The 2SLS estimates indicate
a remarkable magnitude of this impact with a sizeable house price elasticity of credit for the
average manufacturing firm of 0.29. In addition, the 2SLS estimates also point to a heteroge-
neous impact of local house prices on corporate credit. The larger the share of tangible fixed
assets of firms, the larger the additional credit growth for the same local house price shock. This
result points to misallocation of banking credit in the intensive margin within manufacturing
industries. As a complementary result, we illustrate the potential relevance of the collateral
channel on the extensive margin of credit. Indeed, estimates show that local house price shocks
increased the number and the proportion of new loans for firms that had a larger proportion of
real estate assets that are collateralizable.
Finally, we undertake several sensitivity analyses to evaluate the robustness of our findings.
We first explore the potential heterogeneous relevance of the collateral channel depending on
either firm size or the legal nature of banks (commercial versus savings banks) that provided
credit to manufacturing firms. The robustness of the several estimates presented show that
neither firms of a specific size nor the nature of the main provider of credit drives our baseline
results, discarding the possibility that the average impact of the collateral channel during the
housing boom was due to a particular segment of the demand or the supply of capital. Second,
we control for time-varying firm variables (that are not constant at the industry-region-year
level) that can be confounding factors of both investment and credit, and could also be related
to both the valuation of firms’ collateral and our instrument for local house prices shocks. In
particular, our results are robust to the inclusion of two covariates that control for firms’ financial
conditions (leverage ratio and financial costs), as well as to the inclusion of firms’ productivity
shocks to control for the supply determinants of capital accumulation. Third, we add as controls
in our baseline reduced-form regressions predictors of the tangibility rate of firms (quintiles of
the initial log assets value of firms) interacted with the log change of house prices, in order to
mitigate the potential source of bias created by the endogeneity of the tangibility decision over
time. The inclusion of these controls on the pre-boom relative size of the firm in terms of assets
4
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value, which are good predictors of the tangibility rate, produces minor changes on the house
prices elasticities of investment and credit. In the last place, we undertake further robustness
tests of our main estimates to explore the sensitivity of our results to alternative definitions
of the investment rate; the impact of excluding from the estimation sample either firms that
are subsidiaries of multinational firms or large firms that are located in small or medium-
size municipalities; the effect on the efficiency of our estimates of clustering standard errors
at different levels; or the relevance of the collateral channel beyond manufacturing industries.
This set of sensitivity analysis supports the empirical relevance of the collateral channel on both
investment and the allocation of credit by the banking sector among manufacturing firms.
In the last section, we explore the quantitative contribution of the capital misallocation
generated by the collateral channel on investment to explain the fall of aggregate productivity
in the Spanish manufacturing sector between 2003 and 2007. To quantify the aggregate relevance
of this channel, we first document a positive correlation between local house price growth and
the dispersion of the log capital-labor ratio within manufacturing industries at the municipality
level. This suggestive evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction that the average
dispersion of capital in a given manufacturing industry increases more when the collateralizable
real estate owned by firms are located in municipalities that experience a larger increase in
house prices, revealing misallocation of resources within an industry. At the same time, the
collateral channel affects the allocation of capital in the geographical space. Municipalities that
experience a higher house price appreciation accumulate more capital due to this collateral
channel, thereby generating capital misallocation across the space in line with the geographic
dimension of labor misallocation documented in Hsieh and Moretti (2019).
Considering our reduced-form estimates and the guidance of our theoretical model, we pro-
vide a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact of the housing boom on aggregate
productivity through their effect on capital dispersion within manufacturing industries. At the
empirical level, an important challenge to compute the aggregate effect of local housing booms
is the difficulty to measure the actual size of the house price shock in the economy. To mitigate
this limitation, we follow Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) and Mian and Sufi (2011) and make
the conservative assumption that the average size of the house price shock in the economy can
be proxied by the differential growth rate in the average price of residential houses located
in the first and the fourth quartile of the pre-boom buildable urban land ratio distribution
of municipalities in Spain. Using our estimates on the price elasticity of the variance of the
capital-labor ration and the actual log-difference in real house price growth, we compute that
the housing boom could account for between 35% and 50% of the actual aggregate increase in
the dispersion of capital among manufacturing industries between 2003 and 2007. Given the
theoretical mapping between changes in the variance of the log capital-labor ratio and TFP
growth, this back-of-the-envelope computation indicates that the differential local house price
growth (created by the housing boom) can account for between one-third and half of the total
decline in aggregate TFP in the Spanish manufacturing sector during the housing boom. This
5
instance, given the same local house price shock, manufacturing firms in the 75th percentile
of the distribution of the share of tangible fixed assets invest 98 pp more than manufacturing
firms in the bottom 25th percentile. At the same time, the elasticity of house prices growth
to the investment rate is close to 0 for manufacturing firms with the median tangibility rate
(0.234). This result points out that firms with relatively low tangibility rates could be forced
to cut investment during housing booms in the presence of the collateral channel.
Following the predictions of the model that relate the borrowing capacity of firms with their
collateral value, we also specify a reduced-form credit equation equivalent to the investment
equation but now considering as dependent variable the growth rate of outstanding credit pro-
vided by the banking sector. The OLS and 2SLS estimates of this equation are consistent with
the prediction of the model, that is, firms within an industry located in municipalities that
experience higher house price appreciations receive more banking credit, and the allocation of
credit is positively related with the tangibility of their collateral. The 2SLS estimates indicate
a remarkable magnitude of this impact with a sizeable house price elasticity of credit for the
average manufacturing firm of 0.29. In addition, the 2SLS estimates also point to a heteroge-
neous impact of local house prices on corporate credit. The larger the share of tangible fixed
assets of firms, the larger the additional credit growth for the same local house price shock. This
result points to misallocation of banking credit in the intensive margin within manufacturing
industries. As a complementary result, we illustrate the potential relevance of the collateral
channel on the extensive margin of credit. Indeed, estimates show that local house price shocks
increased the number and the proportion of new loans for firms that had a larger proportion of
real estate assets that are collateralizable.
Finally, we undertake several sensitivity analyses to evaluate the robustness of our findings.
We first explore the potential heterogeneous relevance of the collateral channel depending on
either firm size or the legal nature of banks (commercial versus savings banks) that provided
credit to manufacturing firms. The robustness of the several estimates presented show that
neither firms of a specific size nor the nature of the main provider of credit drives our baseline
results, discarding the possibility that the average impact of the collateral channel during the
housing boom was due to a particular segment of the demand or the supply of capital. Second,
we control for time-varying firm variables (that are not constant at the industry-region-year
level) that can be confounding factors of both investment and credit, and could also be related
to both the valuation of firms’ collateral and our instrument for local house prices shocks. In
particular, our results are robust to the inclusion of two covariates that control for firms’ financial
conditions (leverage ratio and financial costs), as well as to the inclusion of firms’ productivity
shocks to control for the supply determinants of capital accumulation. Third, we add as controls
in our baseline reduced-form regressions predictors of the tangibility rate of firms (quintiles of
the initial log assets value of firms) interacted with the log change of house prices, in order to
mitigate the potential source of bias created by the endogeneity of the tangibility decision over
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value, which are good predictors of the tangibility rate, produces minor changes on the house
prices elasticities of investment and credit. In the last place, we undertake further robustness
tests of our main estimates to explore the sensitivity of our results to alternative definitions
of the investment rate; the impact of excluding from the estimation sample either firms that
are subsidiaries of multinational firms or large firms that are located in small or medium-
size municipalities; the effect on the efficiency of our estimates of clustering standard errors
at different levels; or the relevance of the collateral channel beyond manufacturing industries.
This set of sensitivity analysis supports the empirical relevance of the collateral channel on both
investment and the allocation of credit by the banking sector among manufacturing firms.
In the last section, we explore the quantitative contribution of the capital misallocation
generated by the collateral channel on investment to explain the fall of aggregate productivity
in the Spanish manufacturing sector between 2003 and 2007. To quantify the aggregate relevance
of this channel, we first document a positive correlation between local house price growth and
the dispersion of the log capital-labor ratio within manufacturing industries at the municipality
level. This suggestive evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction that the average
dispersion of capital in a given manufacturing industry increases more when the collateralizable
real estate owned by firms are located in municipalities that experience a larger increase in
house prices, revealing misallocation of resources within an industry. At the same time, the
collateral channel affects the allocation of capital in the geographical space. Municipalities that
experience a higher house price appreciation accumulate more capital due to this collateral
channel, thereby generating capital misallocation across the space in line with the geographic
dimension of labor misallocation documented in Hsieh and Moretti (2019).
Considering our reduced-form estimates and the guidance of our theoretical model, we pro-
vide a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact of the housing boom on aggregate
productivity through their effect on capital dispersion within manufacturing industries. At the
empirical level, an important challenge to compute the aggregate effect of local housing booms
is the difficulty to measure the actual size of the house price shock in the economy. To mitigate
this limitation, we follow Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) and Mian and Sufi (2011) and make
the conservative assumption that the average size of the house price shock in the economy can
be proxied by the differential growth rate in the average price of residential houses located
in the first and the fourth quartile of the pre-boom buildable urban land ratio distribution
of municipalities in Spain. Using our estimates on the price elasticity of the variance of the
capital-labor ration and the actual log-difference in real house price growth, we compute that
the housing boom could account for between 35% and 50% of the actual aggregate increase in
the dispersion of capital among manufacturing industries between 2003 and 2007. Given the
theoretical mapping between changes in the variance of the log capital-labor ratio and TFP
growth, this back-of-the-envelope computation indicates that the differential local house price
growth (created by the housing boom) can account for between one-third and half of the total
decline in aggregate TFP in the Spanish manufacturing sector during the housing boom. This
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exercise illustrates the potential quantitative relevance of local house price booms in reducing
aggregate productivity through the collateral channel on investment.
Related literature. This paper relates to different strands of the literature. First, the
paper is related with the literature on firms’ misallocation of resources that originates from
the seminal paper of Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Since then, there has been a large number of
empirical investigations on the reasons why the actual allocation of inputs may depart from the
optimal one (see Jones, 2016). Among them, this paper is related with research that investi-
gates the role of financial frictions and housing booms to create misallocation of resources. In
the former branch of studies, Midrigan and Xu (2014) and Banerjee and Duflo (2014) show the
capacity of financial frictions in reducing aggregate productivity and thus the possible improve-
ment in inputs allocation among firms when loosening financial restrictions. We differ from
these contributions showing, in the opposite direction, that misallocation within industries can
increase when the easing of financial conditions is biased toward the holding of a specific type
of asset such as real estate. On the role of housing booms to create misallocation, the litera-
ture used to focus on the sectoral distortions created when booms transfer resources towards
construction and real-estate activities draining inputs from other productive activities such as
manufacturing (Basco, 2016; Garcia-Santana et al., 2020)4. Instead, this paper examines the
spreading capacity of local housing booms to create misallocation within industries whose main
activity is non-related with the construction sector.
The paper is also related with the literature that connects housing booms with corporate in-
vestment and credit allocation across firms. Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay (2018) show
that in the United States the housing boom created a crowding-out effect that decreased firms’
investment because of banks active in strong housing markets increased residential mortgage
lending to the detriment of commercial lending on firms. Mart́ın, Moral-Benito and Schmitz
(forthcoming) also find that during the Spanish housing boom banks first crowd-out non-housing
credit but later on they were able to expand their credit supply on firms as the housing boom
improved bank’s net worth. In this paper we show that firms in industries non-related to hous-
ing activities but more exposed to local house price booms received more credit. We identify
the collateral channel within firms created by local housing booms as the mechanism that lead
banks to expand corporate credit. In this sense, the paper is related with several papers that
have studied the connection between house price fluctuations and corporate investment. In
particular, our mechanism is close to Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) that showed the exis-
tence of a sizeable collateral channel on the U.S. corporate investment5. We complement these
4For the case of Spain, Garcia-Santana et al. (2020) suggest that the misallocation across sectors during the
Spanish housing boom was related with the degree of connections in each industry with the public sector.
5An alternative branch of this literature connects the impact of house price booms with the sectoral composi-
tion of the activity. As an example, Arce, Campa and Gavilán (2013) provide a model to explain how differences
in the collateral composition across sectors may explain the relative increase in investment and debt of the con-
struction sector with respect to the manufacturing sector during the credit boom fueled by a fall in interest
rate.
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results showing the relevance of the collateral channel on investment as a potential source of
misallocation of resources within industries. This channel also differentiates our contribution
from a closed paper to us by Gopinath et al. (2017). In the latter, the authors argue that a
declining trend in real interest rates pushed capital inflows in southern euro-area economies
ca sing a misallocation of capital towards firms with more net worth and thereby reducing the
TFP in countries like Spain. Instead, we identify a micro-mechanism associated to local house
prices that can explain how capital inflows, when associated to housing booms, can create mis-
allocation of capital within manufacturing industries. The consideration of heterogeneous local
house prices boo s introduces a geographical dimensio in the misallocation of inputs that
allows us to explore the quantitative contribution of housing booms to the decline of aggregate
productivity.
This paper is also related to the urban economics literature that shows the impact of initial
geographical conditions on the evolution of local house prices (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008,
Saiz, 2010), as well as with the investigations that relate this connection with the evolution
of credit and the real economy (Mian and Sufi, 2009, Mian and Sufi, 2011, and Mian, Rao
and Sufi, 2013). We contribute to this literature by considering the relationship between local
house prices, through geographic conditions, and capital misallocation within industries. The
geographic dimension of misallocation is also explored in Hsieh and Moretti (2019) that showed
the significant impact of local restrictions to housing supply to create spatial misallocation of
labor across metropolitan areas in the United States. We also explore this spatial channel but
instead we identify the impact of housing supply restrictions on capital misallocation within
industries as a source of aggregate productivity losses.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present suggestive aggregate evidence on
the remarkable dynamics of credit-funded corporate investment, house prices and productivity
occurred in Spain during the late 2000s. In section 3, we lay out a stylized model that connects
the collateral channel of investment and credit created by local house price booms with capital
misallocation within manufacturing industries. Section 4 introduces the administrative firm-
level and municipality-level data used in our empirical analysis. In section 5, we first present the
identification strategy to estimate the causal impact of local house price booms in investment
and credit across manufacturing firms. Then, we discuss the estimates obtained from an instru-
mental variable procedure and the implications of these results in terms of capital misallocation.
In section 6, we provide a back-of-the envelope computation on the aggregate effects of local
house price booms on productivity through the misallocation of capital among manufacturing
industries. Section 7 concludes.
2 Macroeconomic Background and Suggestive Evidence
In this section, we provide suggestive evidence on the relevance of the salient macroeconomic
event occurred in Spain during the late 2000s. We argue that this episode was exceptional in
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terms of house prices, investment and corporate debt dynamics, and we relate these trends with
productivity dynamics as well as to the pre-boom local real estate market conditions in Spain.
The boom in house prices in Spain in the late 2000s was a large macroeconomic event by
international standards. Indeed, Figure 1a reports the evolution of the Case-Shiller residential
house prices index in Spain and in the United States. Notice that the extraordinary US housing
boom resulted in an average house price growth of 70% from 2000 to 2007, meanwhile in Spain
house prices rose well-above 120% over the same period. This impressive increase in house
prices in Spain was heterogeneous across municipalities and correlated with local geographical
conditions. To give empirical content to those geographical conditions, we use the ratio of
buildable urban land in a municipality in 1997 (before the housing boom). This measure was
built in Basco, Lopez-Rodriguez and Elias (2021) in the spirit of the housing supply elasticity
measure developed by Saiz (2010) for the U.S.6 Simple descriptive evidence indicates that the
average (real) house price growth per square meter during the peak of the housing boom (2003-
2007) was 9.5 percentage points higher for municipalities in the bottom quartile of the land
availability distribution than in the top quartile. For ease of exposition, we label municipalities
in these percentiles as housing supply inelastic and elastic, respectively.
The large increase in house prices coincided with a boom in non-residential corporate invest-
ment in Spain. The magnitude of this rise in investment was not comparable with investment
dynamics in other developed countries. As illustrated in Figure 1b, the non-residential corpo-
rate investment in Spain raised by 70% between 2000 and 2007, meanwhile other big economies
in the euro area, such as Italy or Germany, with a common monetary policy experienced cumu-
lative increases of just 26% and 35% respectively. The United States also experienced a slower
growth path than Spain with a 33% cumulative increase of non-residential corporate investment
during the expansion started in 2002 (OECD, 2018). Besides of the aggregate numbers, the
non-residential investment boom in Spain was also heterogeneous across municipalities and the
size of this boom also correlated with their pre-boom local housing market conditions. This
geographical heterogeneity can be noticed from descriptive statistics on the percentage change
in the average real stock of capital per labor expenditures of firms located in both elastic and
inelastic municipalities over the business cycle.7 In particular, the average real stock of capital
per labor expenditures increased in municipalities with constraints in their supply of buildable
urban land by 180% from 2000 to 2007, whereas it only increased by 35% in housing supply
elastic municipalities. In contrast, the drop in the real stock of capital per labor expenditure
in 2013, from the peak of the boom in 2007, was larger in inelastic towns (-35% versus -8%)
that also experienced a fall in house prices higher than in elastic towns. This evidence hints to
6See subsection 4.2 for further details on both the measure of buildable urban land and the residential house
prices used in this paper.
7The average real stock of capital per labor expenditure in each town-quartile is obtained weighting the
capital-labor ratio of each firm by the firm production’s share in the aggregate production of firms located in
that quartile of the distribution of the buildable urban land for Spanish municipalities.
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a connection between local house price dynamics and investment related with pre-boom local
housing market conditions.
Spanish non-financial corporations funded their investment projects with an intensive use
of banking credit. This trend resulted in an increase of the aggregate corporate leverage ratio
in terms of GDP well-above the rise that this ratio experienced in other euro zone countries
that also received capital inflows during the 2000s (see Figure 1c). One outstanding feature
of the banking credit in Spain during this period was the increasing relevance of collateralized
loans with real estate assets as a guarantee (see Figure 1d). Indeed, the share of credit to
non-financial corporations that had real estate guarantees as a collateral peaked 45% of total
granted credit in 2007, representing 35% of GDP. Note that the peak in collateralized credit
also coincides with the peak in house prices (see Figure 1a).
The use of collateralized loans was particularly relevant in the manufacturing sector. Ac-
cording to the Central Credit Register owned by the Bank of Spain, the share of credit granted
in commercial and industrial loans backed by real guarantees was on average 82.1% during
the period 2000-2007. The remarkable increase of house prices in Spain emerges as a poten-
tial explanation of the boom in collateralized loans that fuelled private investment through
the banking credit. Arguably, this mechanism could have been more powerful in areas where
geographical conditions limited the supply of housing and thus house prices increased more.
The Spanish boom in non-residential investment financed by debt coincided with an increase in
standard empirical measures of capital misallocation within industries (Gopinath et al., 2017)
and, consistently, a documented fall in aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). Figure 2 pro-
vides suggestive evidence on the potential contribution of local housing markets conditions to
exacerbate this misallocation of capital. The figure reports the evolution of an average measure
of capital misallocation for firms located respectively in elastic and inelastic municipalities, and
also for the average municipality, from 2000 to 2012. We measure misallocation using the vari-
ance of the log real capital-labor ratio, which is considered a key determinant of productivity
dynamics (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). The variance of the real capital-labor ratio (of non-financial
firms) in the average municipality increased by 27.3% between 2000 and 2007, which points to
rising aggregate misallocation of capital in Spain. This aggregate fact was also documented
in Gopinath et al. (2017). However, the aggregate figure hides the geographical heterogeneity
reflected in the differential increase across municipalities depending on their (pre-boom) urban
land availability. Indeed, note that the lines for housing supply elastic and inelastic municipali-
ties grow apart during the housing boom and start to converge after the burst. Quantitatively,
during the 2000-2007 period the increase in the variance of the log real capital-labor ratio in
inelastic municipalities (40.1%) almost doubled the increase in the elastic ones (23.5%).
The suggestive evidence presented in this section paints a picture consistent with the view
that the housing boom could have exacerbated the misallocation of capital in Spain. In addition,
it hints to the interaction between geographical constraints and the collateral channel as the
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a connection between local house price dynamics and investment related with pre-boom local
housing market conditions.
Spanish non-financial corporations funded their investment projects with an intensive use
of banking credit. This trend resulted in an increase of the aggregate corporate leverage ratio
in terms of GDP well-above the rise that this ratio experienced in other euro zone countries
that also received capital inflows during the 2000s (see Figure 1c). One outstanding feature
of the banking credit in Spain during this period was the increasing relevance of collateralized
loans with real estate assets as a guarantee (see Figure 1d). Indeed, the share of credit to
non-financial corporations that had real estate guarantees as a collateral peaked 45% of total
granted credit in 2007, representing 35% of GDP. Note that the peak in collateralized credit
also coincides with the peak in house prices (see Figure 1a).
The use of collateralized loans was particularly relevant in the manufacturing sector. Ac-
cording to the Central Credit Register owned by the Bank of Spain, the share of credit granted
in commercial and industrial loans backed by real guarantees was on average 82.1% during
the period 2000-2007. The remarkable increase of house prices in Spain emerges as a poten-
tial explanation of the boom in collateralized loans that fuelled private investment through
the banking credit. Arguably, this mechanism could have been more powerful in areas where
geographical conditions limited the supply of housing and thus house prices increased more.
The Spanish boom in non-residential investment financed by debt coincided with an increase in
standard empirical measures of capital misallocation within industries (Gopinath et al., 2017)
and, consistently, a documented fall in aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). Figure 2 pro-
vides suggestive evidence on the potential contribution of local housing markets conditions to
exacerbate this misallocation of capital. The figure reports the evolution of an average measure
of capital misallocation for firms located respectively in elastic and inelastic municipalities, and
also for the average municipality, from 2000 to 2012. We measure misallocation using the vari-
ance of the log real capital-labor ratio, which is considered a key determinant of productivity
dynamics (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). The variance of the real capital-labor ratio (of non-financial
firms) in the average municipality increased by 27.3% between 2000 and 2007, which points to
rising aggregate misallocation of capital in Spain. This aggregate fact was also documented
in Gopinath et al. (2017). However, the aggregate figure hides the geographical heterogeneity
reflected in the differential increase across municipalities depending on their (pre-boom) urban
land availability. Indeed, note that the lines for housing supply elastic and inelastic municipali-
ties grow apart during the housing boom and start to converge after the burst. Quantitatively,
during the 2000-2007 period the increase in the variance of the log real capital-labor ratio in
inelastic municipalities (40.1%) almost doubled the increase in the elastic ones (23.5%).
The suggestive evidence presented in this section paints a picture consistent with the view
that the housing boom could have exacerbated the misallocation of capital in Spain. In addition,
it hints to the interaction between geographical constraints and the collateral channel as the
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potential mechanism through which the rise in local house prices could have contributed to an
increase in both non-residential investment and debt. This collateral channel is more likely to be
quantitatively relevant in Spain because firms highly rely on collateralized loans to obtain funds
from the banking system. To empirically investigate these hypotheses, in the next section we first
present a simple model that examines the impact of the collateral mechanism at the firm level
on aggregate capital misallocation when local geographical conditions result in heterogeneous
house prices dynamics. Then, section 5 reports the results on the causal relation between local
housing booms and capital misallocation, suggested by the aggregate evidence discussed in this
section and predicted by the model. To perform this analysis, we use an administrative database
that matches firm and bank-level data on investment and credit with local data on house prices
and buildable urban land supply at municipality level (see section 4 for details).
3 House Prices, Investment and Misallocation
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model to derive the most salient empirical
predictions on the effects of local house price booms on corporate investment and banking credit,
when firms exhibit a heterogeneous composition of collateralizable assets. The model also serves
the purpose to define the concepts of capital misallocation and local housing booms used in this
paper. These definitions are needed to derive the conditions under which the misallocation of
capital within industries, originated by a collateral channel, can create productivity losses in
the economy.
To analyze the impact of a collateral channel on corporate investment, we consider a stylized
static partial equilibrium model in which firms with heterogeneous composition of assets face
borrowing constraints. We assume an economy composed of J manufacturing industries but, for
analytical simplicity, we consider one representative industry within the manufacturing sector.
In this industry there is a continuum of firms with mass I, indexed by i. Firms are endowed
with physical capital k used for production and two non-productive capital inputs that can be
collateralized: real estate or housing assets hi and non-real estate assets ηi.
We assume that financial markets are not perfect. Borrowers could avoid total repayment
of debt by paying a fraction θ of the value of their collateralized assets. Thus, firms face the
following borrowing constraint, Rdi ≤ θ
[
pshi H + ηi
]
, where R is the real interest rate, di, is the
amount borrowed by firm i, p is the price of real estate assets and shi = hi/H is the share of real-
estate assets owned by firm i.8 Firms in this industry have access to a production technology,
f(k) = kα. We assume that f ′(k) > R, which guarantees that the borrowing constraint is
8The micro-foundation of this borrowing constraint is the presence of moral hazard in the lender-borrower
relationship. As in the seminal paper by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the borrower needs to provide assets as
a collateral to obtain credit. The parameter θ could be interpreted as a measure of financial development such
that the lower is θ, the less the borrower needs to avoid repayment and, thus, the less credit will be granted. A
similar collateral constraint is used in Monacelli (2009) and Basco (2014).
10
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2135
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f(k) = kα. We assume that f ′(k) > R, which guarantees that the borrowing constraint is
8The micro-foundation of this borrowing constraint is the presence of moral hazard in the lender-borrower
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binding. Therefore, since k = d, the investment of firm i is ki = θ
[
pshi H + ηi
]
/R.
In t is economy, goods an capital m rk ts re integra ed but eal estate m rkets are local.
particular, ther is a continuum of municipalities with mass M , indexed by m. The real
estate as ets of each firm are locate in a mu icipality m where th firm is placed. We assum
that in each municipali y the supply of housing is given by HSm = hm(pm, εm) = p
εm
m , where pm
is the house price and εm is the elasticity of housing supply in municipality m. We denote by
σm = σ the fundamental demand for houses in the municipality.
In order to isolate the effect of heterogeneous composition of collateralized assets on firms’
investment and inputs allocation, we assum that the only difference between firms within n
industry is their composition of asset . For simplici y, we assum that low-i firms only own real




κ if i < κ
0 if i > κ
ηi =
{
0 if i < κ
η if i > κ
In line with the suggestive macroeconomic evidence for Spain described in section 2, we
assume that in this economy emerges a housing boom that is heterogeneous across municipalities
as a result of their initial geographical conditions. In particular, we assume that the demand
for houses (real estate) in a municipality m is given by σ + B, with the decoupling of demand
with respect the fundamental level given by B > 0. This demand decoupling is assumed, for
analytical simplicity, to be homogeneous across municipalities. These assumptions imply that,
given the housing supply in the municipality, the equilibrium house price is p∗m = (σ +B)
1/εm ,
which is directly related with the decoupling of housing demand, B, and inversely related with
the elasticity of housing supply in the municipality, εm. The increase in house prices created
by a decoupling in demand is what we label as a housing boom. Note that, given a level of
demand decoupling B, the local housing boom is larger in municipalities with a lower housing
supply elasticity (see Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008), Mian and Sufi (2011) or Basco (2014)
for a theoretical justification and evidence for the U.S.). Thus, lower housing supply elasticities
create larger increases in local house prices when the wedge between local housing demand and
its fundamental level widens.10
9This assumption simplifies the notation and algebra but qualitative results are the same when assuming that
firms have both types of collateralizable assets but in different proportions. The theoretical derivations in this
section, thus, provide predictions in terms of averages.
10We make these assumptions in order to consider the case in which housing demand is above its fundamental
level, in line with the real estate market situation in Spain over the period 2003-2007 that preceded the house
price burst across Spanish regions (Santos, 2014). However, in the model we do not take a stand neither on the
origin of the demand decoupling nor on the roots of the so-called housing bubble in Spain. The framework is
thus consistent with several alternative explanations about the origin of the housing boom such as i) a potential
rational housing bubble due to a shortage of assets created by international capital inflows (see Basco, 2014 for a
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We last assume a symmetry condition such at η = 1κσ
1+ε
ε . This assumption i plies that,
in the absence of local housing booms, the relative price of assets is the same and, therefore,
the value of the endowment is the same for all firms.
Conside ing these a sumption , we can derive a set of empirical predictions on the eff cts of
loc l hou ing booms on co porate investme t, credit and allocatio of ca ital within an industry
when firms have a he erogeneous composition of collater lizable assets.
Prediction 1 In an economy (municipality) that experiences a housing boom, investment
rates in an industry increase relatively more among firms that own real estate assets. Given
the composition of collateralizable assets, the difference in relative investment rates among
firms within an industry is larger for firms located in municipalities with lower housing supply
elasticities, which experience larger house price increases.
The equilibrium rel tive inv stment rate of firms t t own real state assets (i < κ) lo a ed
in municipality m that experiences a housi g b om (B), with resp ct to n equilibriu without
a housing boom (NB), is11
kwith real estate, Bm







≡ Φ(B, εm) > 1 =
kwith real estate, NBm
kwithout real estate, NBm
.
This expression implies th t for the set of firms within an industry located in the sam
municipality, the relative invest ent rate of firms that own real estate assets (with respect to
firms without those assets) i creases when there is a h usi g boom in the municip lity (B > 0).
We obtain a similar expression that illustrates the amplifying effect on investment rate differ-
entials among firms within an industry created by the heterogeneity of geographical conditions
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11Note that we are using the equilibrium house price to obtain this expression. In particular, in each munici-
pality m, the relative rate of investment is given by kw/knw = (1/κ)(p∗·h)/η, where p∗ = (σ+B)1/ε and h = pε.
The superscripts w and nw denote, respectively, with and without real estate.
12It is straightforward, given symmetry condition, that Φ(B, ε) > 1. In addition, ∂Φ(B,ε)
∂ε




We last assume a symmetry condition such that η = 1κσ
1+ε
ε . This assu ption implies that,
in the absence of local housing booms, the relative price of assets is the same and, therefore,
the value of the endowment is the same for all firms.
Con ide ing t ese assumptio s, we can derive a se of empirical pr diction o the effects of
local housing booms on corporate investment, credit and allocation of capital within an industry
when firms have a heterogeneous composition of collateralizable assets.
Prediction 1 In an economy (municipality) that experiences a housing boom, investment
rates in an industry increase relatively more among firms that own real estate assets. Given
the composition of collateralizable assets, the difference in relative investment rates among
firms within an industry is larger for firms located in municipalities with lower housing supply
elasticities, which experience larger house price increases.
The equilibr um rela ive v stment rate of fir s that own real estate assets (i < κ) located
in municipality m that experiences a housing boom (B), with respect to an equilibrium without
a housing boom (NB), is11
kwith real estat , Bm







≡ Φ(B, εm) > 1 =
kwith real estate, NBm
kwithout real estate, NBm
.
This xpression implies that for the set of firms within an industry located in the same
municipality, the relative investment rate of firms that own real estate assets (with respect to
firms without those assets) increases when there is a o sing boom in the municipality (B > 0).
We obtain a similar expression that illustrates the amplifying effect on investment rate differ-
entials among firms within an industry created by the heterogeneity of geographical conditions
across municipalities. In particular, given the same composition of collateralizable assets and
the same housing demand decoupling B, the difference in relative investment rates among firms
within an industry is larger for firms located in housing supply inelastic municipalities:12
Φ(B, εm) > Φ(B, εm′) if εm < εm′
The intuition for this result is that a housing booms raises the collateral value of firms that
own real estate assets. This effect is exacerbated in municipalities where ε is small because
theoretical model on this mechanism); ii) the existence of unrealistic expectations on future house price increases
(see Case and Shiller, 2003 for a discussion of this channel in the United States); iii) the presence of behavioural
housing bubbles that explain capital inflows (Laibson and Mollerstrom, 2009); or iv) rational housing bubbles
that emerge from financial frictions in a closed economy (Arce and López-Salido, 2011).
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the increase in housing prices is decreasing with the housing supply elasticity. This channel
indicates that capital accumulation across space is shaped by geographical conditions. Note
that in the absence of a housing boom, i.e., when housing demand is equal to its fundamental
level, firms with different composition of assets have the same endowment value and thus invest
the same amount regardless of their geographic location across the space.
In the model, we assume that investment is equivalent to credit (D = K) and there is no
credit rationing. Thus, we can derive a corollary of the previous investment prediction on credit
allocation.
Prediction 2 In an economy (municipality) that experiences a housing boom, the volume
of credit allocated within an industry is larger among firms that own real estate assets. Given
the composition of collateralizable assets, the allocation of credit within an industry is larger for
firms located in municipalities which experience larger house price appreciations due to lower
housing supply elasticities.
In case we considered the existence of credit rationing in this economy, a corollary of the
previous prediction is that the likelihood of receiving credit depends on the value of the firms’
collateral. In the presence of local housing booms, firms in the same industry that are located
in a given municipality are more likely to receive credit when they own real estate assets. The
larger the size of the local housing boom, i.e., the lower the housing supply elasticity is, the
larger is the probability of receiving credit when firms own real estate assets.
Prediction 3 In an economy (municipality) that experiences a housing boom, the dispersion
of capital among firms within an industry is larger when firms have heterogeneous valuations of
their collateralizable assets. This industry misallocation of capital is larger when municipalities
experience heterogeneous house price appreciations due to their initial geographical conditions
(i.e., heterogeneous housing supply elasticities).
Given the equilibrium investment condition for firms within an industry, the standard de-
viation of capital in municipality m that experiences a housing boom (B), with respect to the
equilibrium in which the municipality does not experience a housing boom (NB), is given by





> 0 = st.d(k)NBm . (1)
This expression indicates that in the benchmark case in which no municipality experiences a
housing boom, Φm = 1 for all m, the standard deviation of capital within an industry is zero. In
this case, the heterogeneity in the composition of collateralizable assets does not create capital
misallocation. In the case of a local housing boom occurring, Φm > 1 for some m, the standard
deviation of capital among firms within an industry is positive when firms located in this
booming municipality do not have the same composition of assets (i.e., it would be higher than
zero unless all firms had real estate assets, (κ = M), or no firm had real estate assets, (κ = 0)).
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We last assume a symmetry condition such that η = 1κσ
1+ε
ε . This assumption implies that,
in the absence of local housing booms, the relative price of assets is the same and, therefore,
the value of the endowment is the same for all firms.
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the composition of collateralizable assets, the difference in relative investment rates among
firms within an industry is larger for firms located in municipalities with lower housing supply
elasticities, which experience larger house price increases.
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This expression implies that for the set of firms within an industry located in the same
municipality, the relative investment rate of firms that own real estate assets (with respect to
firms without those assets) increases when there is a housing boom in the municipality (B > 0).
We obtain a similar expression that illustrates the amplifying effect on investment rate differ-
entials among firms within an industry created by the heterogeneity of geographical conditions
across municipalities. In particular, given the same composition of collateralizable assets and
the same housing demand decoupling B, the difference in relative investment rates among firms
within an industry is larger for firms located in housing supply inelastic municipalities:12
Φ(B, εm) > Φ(B, εm′) if εm < εm′
The intuition for this result is that a housing booms raises the collateral value of firms that
own real estate assets. This effect is exacerbated in municipalities where ε is small because
theoretical model on this mechanism); ii) the existence of unrealistic expectations on future house price increases
(see Case and Shiller, 2003 for a discussion of this channel in the United States); iii) the presence of behavioural
housing bubbles that explain capital infl ws (Laibson and Mollerstrom, 2009); or iv) rational ho sing bubbles
that emerge from financial frictions in a closed economy (Arce and López-Salido, 2011).
11Note that we are using the equilibrium house price to obtain this expression. In particular, in each munici-
pality m, the relative rate of investment is given by kw/knw = (1/κ)(p∗·h)/η, where p∗ = (σ+B)1/ε and h = pε.
The superscripts w and nw denote, respectively, with and without real estate.
12 t is straightforward, given symmetry conditio , that Φ(B, ε) > 1. In a dition, ∂Φ(B,ε)
∂ε




We last assume a symmetry condition such that η = 1κσ
1+ε
ε . This assumption implies that,
in the absence of local housing booms, the relative price of assets is the same and, therefore,
the value of the endowment is the same for all firms.
Considering these assumptions, we can derive a set of empirical predictions on the effects of
local housing booms on corporate investment, credit and allocation of capital within an industry
when firms have a heterogeneous composition of collateralizable asse s.
Prediction 1 In an economy (municipality) that experiences a housing boom, investment
rates in an industry increase relatively more among firms that own real estate assets. Given
the composition of collateralizable assets, the difference in relative investment rates among
firms within an industry is larger for firms located in municipalities with lower housing supply
elasticities, which experience larger house price increases.
The equilibrium relative investment rate of firms that own real estate assets (i < κ) located
in municipal y m that experiences a housing boom (B), with respe t to an equilibrium withou
a housing boom (NB), is11
kwith real estate, Bm







≡ Φ(B, εm) > 1 =
kwith real estate, NBm
kwithout real estate, NBm
.
This expression implies that for the set of firms within an industry located in the same
municipality, the relative investment rate of firms that own real estate assets (with respect to
firms without those assets) increases when there is a housing boom in the municipality (B > 0).
We obtain a similar expression that illustrates the amplifying effect on investment rate differ-
entials among firms within an industry created by the heterogeneity of geographical conditions
across municipalities. In particular, given the same composition of collateralizable assets and
the same housing demand decoupling B, the difference in relative investment rates among firms
within an industry is larger for firms located in housing supply inelastic municipalities:12
Φ(B, εm) > Φ(B, εm′) if εm < εm′
The intuition for this result is that a housing booms raises the collateral value of firms that
own real estate assets. This effect is exacerbated in municipalities where ε is small because
theoretical model on this mechanism); ii) the existen of un alistic expectations o future house price increases
(see Case and Shiller, 2003 for a discussion of this channel in the United States); iii) the presence of behavioural
housing bubbles that explain capital inflows (Laibson and Mollerstrom, 2009); or iv) rational housing bubbles
that emerge from fin ncial frictions in a closed economy (Arce and Lóp z-Salido, 2011).
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the increase in housing prices is decreasing with the housing supply elasticity. This channel
indicates that capital accumulation across space is shaped by geographical conditions. Note
that in the absence of a housing boom, i.e., when housing demand is equal to its fundamental
level, firms with different composition of assets have the same endowment value and thus invest
the same amount regardless of their geographic location across the space.
In the model, we assume that investment is equivalent to credit (D = K) and there is no
credit rationing. Thus, we can derive a corollary of the previous investment prediction on credit
allocation.
Prediction 2 In an economy (municipality) that experiences a housing boom, the volume
of credit allocated within an industry is larger among firms that own real estate assets. Given
the composition of collateralizable assets, the allocation of credit within an industry is larger for
firms located in municipalities which experience larger house price appreciations due to lower
housing supply elasticities.
In case we considered the existence of credit rationing in this economy, a corollary of the
previous prediction is that the likelihood of receiving credit depends on the value of the firms’
collateral. In the presence of local housing booms, firms in the same industry that are located
in a given municipality are more likely to receive credit when they own real estate assets. The
larger the size of the local housing boom, i.e., the lower the housing supply elasticity is, the
larger is the probability of receiving credit when firms own real estate assets.
Prediction 3 In an economy (municipality) that experiences a housing boom, the dispersion
of capital among firms within an industry is larger when firms have heterogeneous valuations of
their collateralizable assets. This industry misallocation of capital is larger when municipalities
experience heterogeneous house price appreciations due to their initial geographical conditions
(i.e., heterogeneous housing supply elasticities).
Given the equilibrium investment condition for firms within an industry, the standard de-
viation of capital in municipality m that experiences a housing boom (B), with respect to the
equilibrium in which the municipality does not experience a housing boom (NB), is given by





> 0 = st.d(k)NBm . (1)
This expression indicates that in the benchmark case in which no municipality experiences a
housing boom, Φm = 1 for all m, the standard deviation of capital within an industry is zero. In
this case, the heterogeneity in the composition of collateralizable assets does not create capital
misallocation. In the case of a local housing boom occurring, Φm > 1 for some m, the standard
deviation of capital among firms within an industry is positive when firms located in this
booming municipality do not have the same composition of assets (i.e., it would be higher than
zero unless all firms had real estate assets, (κ = M), or no firm had real estate assets, (κ = 0)).
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In the case that municipalities experience heterogeneous local housing booms, the dispersion of
capital within an industry increases even when firms have the same heterogeneous composition of
collateralizable assets but they are located in different municipalities, resulting in heterogeneous
valuations of firms’ collateral. In particular, given the same composition of collateralizable
assets, the dispersion of capital between firms within an industry increases because of the
heterogeneous valuations of firms’ collateral that arise due to the location of real estate assets in
municipalities with a lower housing supply elasticity. That is, st.d(k)Bm > st.d(k)
B
m′ if εm < εm′ .
This is the case because ∂st.d(k)
B
∂ε < 0, given
∂Φ
∂ε < 0.
This prediction implies that the allocation of capital within an industry is less efficient
when a housing boom gives rise to heterogeneous local house price booms across municipalities,
resulting in firms having heterogeneous valuations of their collateralizable assets. The intuition
is that firms, within an industry, located in areas where house prices are booming are able
to invest more and obtain more credit because the value of their real estate assets increases
more than the collateral value of firms located in municipalities that experience lower house
price appreciations. Thus, geography emerges as a channel that shapes the allocation of capital
through their impact on real estate prices. The next prediction relates this misallocation of
capital to lower TFP.
Prediction 4 The average TFP within an industry is lower when a housing boom creates a
change in the relative valuation of firms’ collateralizable assets and firms have a heterogeneous
proportion of real estate assets. Given a heterogeneous composition of collateralizable assets
across firms within an industry, the decline in the (average) industry TFP is larger when a
larger proportion of firms are located in municipalities with lower housing supply elasticities,
which experience lager house price appreciations.
We compute a measure of the average TFP within an industry departing from the common
production function f(k) = kα. Given the simplifying assumption on two types of firms in
terms of the composition of collateralizable assets, the aggregate output in an industry is thus




M , where 1 refers to firms with low i index, and 2 for firms with high i index.
Considering that Y = TFP ·Kα, it follows that the average TFP within an industry when the













It is straightforward to see that industry TFP has an inverse-U shape with maximum at
Φ = 1, absent any housing boom (NB), when housing demand equals the fundamental level
in all municipalities (TFPmax = TFPNB). When municipalities experience a local housing
boom (B > 0), the collateral value of firms that own a higher proportion of real estate assets
increases relatively more (Φ > 1), and thus the average TFP decreases (TFPB < TFPNB).
In the case that municipalities experience heterogeneous local housing booms, Φ would differ
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the increase in housing prices is decreasing with the housing supply elasticity. This channel
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housing boom, Φm = 1 for all m, the standard deviation of capital within an industry is zero. In
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In the case that municipalities experience heterogeneous local housing booms, the dispersion of
capital within an industry increases even when firms have the same heterogeneous composition of
collateralizable assets but they are located in different municipalities, resulting in heterogeneous
valuations of firms’ collateral. In particular, given the same composition of collateralizable
assets, the dispersion of capital between firms within an industry increases because of the
heterogeneous valuations of firms’ collateral that arise due to the location of real estate assets in
municipalities with a lower housing supply elasticity. That is, st.d(k)Bm > st.d(k)
B
m′ if εm < εm′ .
This is the case because ∂st.d(k)
B
∂ε < 0, given
∂Φ
∂ε < 0.
This prediction implies that the allocation of capital within an industry is less efficient
when a housing boom gives rise to heterogeneous local house price booms across municipalities,
resulting in firms having heterogeneous valuations of their collateralizable assets. The intuition
is that firms, within an industry, located in areas where house prices are booming are able
to invest more and obtain more credit because the value of their real estate assets increases
more than the collateral value of firms located in municipalities that experience lower house
price appreciations. Thus, geography emerges as a channel that shapes the allocation of capital
through their impact on real estate prices. The next prediction relates this misallocation of
capital to lower TFP.
Prediction 4 The average TFP within an industry is lower when a housing boom creates a
change in the relative valuation of firms’ collateralizable assets and firms have a heterogeneous
proportion of real estate assets. Given a heterogeneous composition of collateralizable assets
across firms within an industry, the decline in the (average) industry TFP is larger when a
larger proportion of firms are located in municipalities with lower housing supply elasticities,
which experience lager house price appreciations.
We compute a measure of the average TFP within an industry departing from the common
production function f(k) = kα. Given the simplifying assumption on two types of firms in
terms of the composition of collateralizable assets, the aggregate output in an industry is thus
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It is straightforward to see that industry TFP has an inverse-U shape with maximum at
Φ = 1, absent any housing boom (NB), when housing demand equals the fundamental level
in all municipalities (TFPmax = TFPNB). When municipalities experience a local housing
boom (B > 0), the collateral value of firms that own a higher proportion of real estate assets
increases relatively more (Φ > 1), and thus the average TFP decreases (TFPB < TFPNB).
In the case that municipalities experience heterogeneous local housing booms, Φ would differ
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across municipalities. Then, equation 2 would result in a weighted average of industry TFP
contributions at municipality level, weighted each contribution by the mass of firms located in
each municipality. In this case, the higher the housing supply elasticity in a municipality where
firms locate, the larger the wedge between the equilibrium TFP in this municipality and the
optimal equilibrium (TFPBm ¡TFP
max
m ). At the same time, it is worth noting that, if all firms
were identical in terms of the composition of their collateralizable assets, industry TFP would
be independent of Φ and, in this case, local housing booms would not create productivity losses.
In line with misallocation models a la Hsieh and Klenow (2009), the variance of the capital-
labor ratio with an industry is a sufficient statistic for the TFP within an industry. In order to
obtained closed form solutions, we assume that M = 1 and κ = 1/2. In that case, by plugging








This equation indicates that the higher the variance of capital within an industry, the lower
the average TFP. In our case, in the absence of a housing boom that creates an increase of house
prices, the variance of capital would be zero and the average TFP would reach its maximum
(technical) level (i.e. efficient allocation of resources). In case of having a housing boom, the
average TFP would be lower, and the higher the size of the local house price appreciation the
lower the TFP (the higher the variance of capital). The magnitude of the aggregate TFP loss
would depend on the relative size of the local house price boom in each municipality and the
location of the mass of firms across these municipalities.
These predictions are derived for a representative manufacturing industry. The aggregate
impact of the collateral channel on productivity in a manufacturing sector composed of J indus-
tries, would simply be the weighted average of productivity losses within each industry weighted
by, for example, the contribution of each industry in the value-added of the manufacturing sec-
tor.
Discussion on asset price booms and misallocation. In this paper, we focus on the
impact of local housing booms on the misallocation of capital. However, the same implications
on capital allocation and productivity would emerge if the boom was attached to other collat-
eralizable assets (e.g. financial assets). The root of the misallocation is the artificial increase
in the collateral value of some firms regardless of their productivity. This mechanism emerges
when the boom in the price of a specific asset modifies the relative valuation of collateralizable
assets, having the capacity to create an asymmetric access to credit and investment rates across
firms that is not related to differences in their idiosyncratic productivities.
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across municipalities. Then, equation 2 would result in a weighted average of industry TFP
contributions at municipality level, weighted each contribution by the mass of firms located in
each municipality. In this case, the higher the housing supply elasticity in a municipality where
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4 Data
In this section, we introduce the data used in the empirical analysis implemented in section 5.
In order to test the empirical predictions of the model, we use a rich firm-level panel dataset
with detailed information on administrative banking credit records and financial statements
of manufacturing firms over the Spanish housing boom. We match this firm-level panel with
municipality-level residential house prices indices that are available for the peak of the Spanish
housing boom that took place from 2003 to 2007 (Santos, 2014). We complement this matched
database with pre-housing boom data on buildable urban land at municipality level. This
database will allow us to use the geographical variation across Spanish municipalities before the
housing boom to examine the impact of local house price booms on firms’ outcomes in terms
of investment and banking credit. In this section, we also discuss the computation of the main
variables of the empirical analysis, measurement issues and relevant assumptions. We defer the
discussion on our identification strategy to section 5.
4.1 Financial statements and banking credit data at firm-level
The firm-level data comes from two administrative data sources on firms’ activity and banking
credit that we match using the fiscal identifier of firms. The first dataset comes from the
reported unconsolidated financial statements that all firms are required to yearly submit by
law to the Commercial Registry (Registro Mercantil Central). We use the information on the
Commercial Registry from the database built in Almunia, Lopez-Rodriguez and Moral-Benito
(2018) for the period 2000-2013 that contains annual information of around 85% of registered
firms in the Spanish non-financial market economy.13 Figure A.1 in appendix A shows that over
the 2003-2007 period the dataset for the manufacturing sector tracks accurately the evolution
over time of the production and the full-time employment according to official census statistics
provided by the Spanish National Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional de Estad́ıstica). In the
same appendix A, table A.1 indicates that the manufacturing firms sample reaches during the
housing boom an average coverage with respect to annual aggregates of 85% for both the wage
bill and the number of firms, and close to 80% for employment. Lastly, table A.2 shows that
the dataset replicates the firm-size distribution of Spanish manufacturing firms in terms of
employment over the housing boom.
This panel dataset includes, among other variables, annual information for each firm on
its fiscal identifier, 5-digit zip code location on its headquarters, sector of activity or industry
(4-digit NACE Rev. 2 code), average number of employees (full-time equivalent) and the most
relevant information contained in their financial statements composed by the Balance Sheet
13The non-financial market economy includes all sectors of activity excluding the ones related with the activity
of the public sector (e.g. health, education, public security or administration), mining industries and the financial
activity (e.g. banking or insurance activities). See Almunia, Lopez-Rodriguez and Moral-Benito (2018) for details
on the cleaning process and construction of the database as well as a more exhaustive representativeness analysis
of this micro dataset with respect to official statistics of the Spanish economy.
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and the Profit and Loss Account. The main variables used in our empirical analysis included
in the reported financial statements are: (i) net operating revenue; (ii) material expenditures
( ost of all r w materials and services purchased by the firm in the production process); (iii)
labor expenditures (total wage bill, including social security contributions); (iv) total assets and
fixed assets; (v) fixed tangible and intangible assets; (vi) financial expenditures; and (vii) total
outstanding debt.
This dataset allow us to compute two firm-level measures of investment: i) the log difference
of capital, where capital is measured as the real book value of fixed assets; and ii) the log
difference of capital-labor ratios, where capital is defined as above and labor refers to wage
bill expenditures in real terms. We also compute measures of (i) leverage, computed as the
ratio of total outstanding debt to the book value of total assets; (ii) the share of tangible fixed
assets, calculated as the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate assets,
factories and equipment) over the book value of total assets; (iii) financial costs, computed as the
ratio of financial expenditures to total outstanding debt; and (iv) firm-level productivity (TFP)
estimated using the procedure proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Real magnitudes result
from deflating nominal values using two-digit industry-specific deflators for capital, output and
materials. The different book value measures of assets are deflated with investment goods
price indices; labor expenditures are deflated using gross output price indices; and material
expenditures and valued-added are deflated using price indices on intermediate consumption at
industry level. These industry-specific deflators are computed by the Bank of Spain (Banco de
España) using data from the Spanish National Statistical Office. The sample of manufacturing
firms with investment data used in our empirical analysis contains 255,855 firm-year observations
that correspond to 71,213 firms over the 2003-2007 period.
We merge the annual database in financial statements with annual aggregated firm-level
information on loan applications and credit exposures of firms with the banking system. This
firm-level credit dat come f om the loan level Centra Credit Register (C ntral de Información
de Riesgos, CIR) collected by the Bank of Spain in its role of supervisor of the Spanish banking
system. This credit register contains detailed monthly information on both granted credit
and drawn down credit from new and outstanding loans over 6,000 euros to non-financial firms
granted by all banks operating in Spain.14 We aggregate this monthly-bank-level data to obtain
information on firm’s annual total credit granted by the banking system. Using information
on the type of lender that provides credit, we create an identifier on the main provider of
firm’s annual credit identifying whether firm’s banking funds mainly come from commercial
banks or savings banks. This distinction on the main credit provider is useful to investigate
the hypothesis that savings banks played a significant negative role on credit misallocation over
14The significantly low reporting threshold implies that virtually all firms with outstanding bank debt are
included in the CIR database. For a detailed discussion on the CIR database see, for instance, Jiménez et al.
(2012).
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the housing boom because of the bad incentives created by their capital structure and political
control (Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos, 2013).
In addition to information on granted loans, CIR also compiles since 2002 monthly requests
lodged by banks to obtain information on outstan ing loans of potential borrowers. Lenders
receive monthly information on the default status a d outstanding debts with all banks of their
current borrowers. These requests thus reveal information on borrowers’ applications to banks
without outstanding debt. This information opens us the possibility to explore the impact of
the housing boom on the extensive margin of credit. Indeed, we compile firm-year level data on
new loans granted by banks and the set of loan applications in order to infer both loans-de ial
rates and the new loans granted by banks to nonconcurrent borrowers. With this information
we are able to construct three an ual magnitudes aimed to measure different dimensions of the
extensive margin of credit. In particular, we compute : (i) a identifier that takes value o e
when at least one firm’s loan application is accepted by a bank; (ii) the number of firm’s loan
applications that are accepted by banks; and (iii) the proportion of new loans of a firm over
the total number of firm’s loans granted by banks. The sample of manufacturing firms with
banking credit data used in our empirical analysis contains 207,506 firm-year observations that
correspond to 61,896 firms over the 2003-2007 period.
In Panel A of Table 1 we present summary statistics for the sample of manufacturing firms
that are located in municipalities for which ata on house prices and the pre-boom ratio of
buildable urban land are available.
4.2 House prices and buil able urban land d ta at municipality-level
The empirical strategy implemented in the paper requires complementing the firm-level dataset
with geographic-base data on municipalities where firms are located. In particular, we use
residential house prices indices and a pre-boom measure of buildable urban land at municipality
level. This municipality-level data is matched with the firm-level dataset using the geographic
lo ation reported by firms in their financ al tatements.
In order to capture the dynamics of local housing booms, we use residential house price
indices at municipality level considering that the change in those local indices well-proxy the
dynamics of the value of real estate assets owned by firms located in a given municipality.15
The information on municipal residential house prices comes from the census of real estate
transactions owned by the Spanish Ownership Registry (Registro de la Propiedad) and shared
with the Bank of Spain since 2003. To compute the price indices, we first calculate the market
value price per square meter for each residential housing transaction and then we aggregate
those prices for all transactions made in a municipality during a natural year to create a yearly
15See next subsection 4.3 for a discussion of the empirical evidence on the co-movement of prices in real estate
markets in Spain.
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average prices per square meter. The price indices for residential housing are calculated from
2003 to 2007 for municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants and more than 30 transactions
per year. These indices are deflated using the Consumer Price Index provided by the Spanish
National Statistical Office.
According to our empirical predictions, the dynamics of real estate prices affects firms’ in-
vestment and credit decisions but those prices can be endogenous to these decisions. To address
the endogeneity problem, in our empirical analysis, we instrument house prices growth using
a proxy for the housing supply elasticity in the geographic area of analysis, in line with the
empirical strategy followed by Mian and Sufi (2011), Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) and
Basco (2014). In particular, we use the measure built in Basco, Lopez-Rodriguez and Elias
(2021) to proxy the physical-geographical relative capacity to build new real estate assets in a
municipality. This measure is computed, for Spanish municipalities, as the pre-housing boom
ratio of available buildable urban land to urban land with already built structures. The con-
struction of this ratio follows the insights provided by Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) on the
impact of supply (geographic) factors on house price dynamics and adapts to the Spanish case
the housing supply elasticity measure proposed by Saiz (2010) for the metropolitan areas in
the United States. The data to construct the proxy for the housing supply elasticity in a given
municipality come from the census data on land classifications reported by the Spanish Cadastre
(Dirección General del Catastro). Within potential urban land, the measure considers undevel-
opable total land after excluding protected non-urban areas (e.g., rivers or natural parks), plots
classified as restricted for rural use, and public goods land (e.g., municipality surface occupied
by transport and utilities infrastructure). The ratio is calculated for several years sufficiently
removed from the housing boom (from 1995 to 1998) to avoid feedback effects of booming prices
on the availability of undevelopable urban land during the Spanish housing boom in the 2000s.
We conjecture that municipalities with a lower buildable urban land ratio (i.e., lower housing
supply elasticity) should have experienced larger house price increases over the housing boom.
Indeed, Table C.1 in appendix C, shows that there is a negative cross-sectional correlation be-
tween the ratio of buildable urban land (computed for different years) and housing price growth
across Spanish municipalities during the housing boom years (2003-2007). We choose the ratio
of buildable urban land in 1997 as a baseline in our empirical analysis because using this year
we maximize the number of municipalities with data in both house prices and the buildable
urban land measure.16
Our empirical strategy uses the geographical variation in the size of local housing booms to
identify the impact of local house price shocks on firms’ investment decisions. We illustrate this
spatial variation in Figure B.1 in Appendix B for the case of the two provinces with the highest
level of economic activity and population in Spain (Madrid and Barcelona). The map plots
16The results of the paper are robust to using different years (1995, 1996 and 1998) of the urban land measure
as a baseline.
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buildable urban land are available.
4.2 House prices and buildable urban land data at municipality-level
The empirical str tegy implemented in he paper requires complementing the firm-level dataset
with ge gra hic-base d ta on municipalities where firms are locate . In particular, we u
residential ho se prices ind ces and a pre-boom measure of buildable urban land at municipality
level. This municipality-level data is ma ched with the firm-level dataset using the geographic
location reported by firms in their fin ncia statements.
In order to capture the dynamics of local housing booms, we use residential house price
indices at municipality level considering that the change in those local indices well-proxy the
dynamics of the value of real estate assets owned by firms located in a given municipality.15
The information on municipal residential house prices comes from the census of real estate
transactions owned by the Spanish Ownership Registry (Registro de la Propiedad) and shared
with the Bank of Spain since 2003. To compute the price indices, we first calculate the market
value price per square meter for each residential housing transaction and then we aggregate
those prices for all transactions made in a municipality during a natural year to create a yearly
15See next subsection 4.3 for a discussion of the empirical evidence on the co-movement of prices in real estate
markets in Spain.
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average prices per square meter. The price indices for residential housing are calculated from
2003 to 2007 for municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants and more than 30 transactions
per year. These indices are deflated using the Consumer Price Index provided by the Spanish
National Statistical Office.
According to our empirical predictions, the dynamics of real estate prices affects firms’ in-
vestment and credit decisions but those prices can be endogenous to these decisions. To address
the endogeneity problem, in our empirical analysis, we instrument house prices growth using
a proxy for the housing supply elasticity in the geographic area of analysis, in line with the
empirical strategy followed by Mian and Sufi (2011), Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) and
Basco (2014). In particular, we use the measure built in Basco, Lopez-Rodriguez and Elias
(2021) to proxy the physical-geographical relative capacity to build new real estate assets in a
municipality. This measure is computed, for Spanish municipalities, as the pre-housing boom
ratio of available buildable urban land to urban land with already built structures. The con-
struction of this ratio follows the insights provided by Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) on the
impact of supply (geographic) factors on house price dynamics and adapts to the Spanish case
the housing supply elasticity measure proposed by Saiz (2010) for the metropolitan areas in
the United States. The data to construct the proxy for the housing supply elasticity in a given
municipality come from the census data on land classifications reported by the Spanish Cadastre
(Dirección General del Catastro). Within potential urban land, the measure considers undevel-
opable total land after excluding protected non-urban areas (e.g., rivers or natural parks), plots
classified as restricted for rural use, and public goods land (e.g., municipality surface occupied
by transport and utilities infrastructure). The ratio is calculated for several years sufficiently
removed from the housing boom (from 1995 to 1998) to avoid feedback effects of booming prices
on the availability of undevelopable urban land during the Spanish housing boom in the 2000s.
We conjecture that municipalities with a lower buildable urban land ratio (i.e., lower housing
supply elasticity) should have experienced larger house price increases over the housing boom.
Indeed, Table C.1 in appendix C, shows that there is a negative cross-sectional correlation be-
tween the ratio of buildable urban land (computed for different years) and housing price growth
across Spanish municipalities during the housing boom years (2003-2007). We choose the ratio
of buildable urban land in 1997 as a baseline in our empirical analysis because using this year
we maximize the number of municipalities with data in both house prices and the buildable
urban land measure.16
Our empirical strategy uses the geographical variation in the size of local housing booms to
identify the impact of local house price shocks on firms’ investment decisions. We illustrate this
spatial variation in Figure B.1 in Appendix B for the case of the two provinces with the highest
level of economic activity and population in Spain (Madrid and Barcelona). The map plots
16The results of the paper are robust to using different years (1995, 1996 and 1998) of the urban land measure
as a baseline.
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cumulative growth rates of real house prices and buildable urban land ratio at the municipality
level within these two provinces. The municipality distribution of these magnitudes at province
level is divided in quartiles. Larger house price growth rates are reported with more intense
red colours, meanwhile greater urban land supply is reflected with more intense blue colours.
This figure shows the existence of significant heterogeneity of these magnitudes within provinces
opening the possibility, in addition to the expected correlation among these magnitudes, of using
this geographical variation to identify the causal effects of local house booms on investment and
credit as will be discussed in the next section.
In P nel B of Table 1 we present summary statistics on house prices and the pre-boom ra io
of buildable urban land for those municipalities whose population exce d 1,000 inhabita ts and
th t have manufacturing firms includ d in the sample.
4.3 Measuremen I sues
Wemake several assumptions to overcome the limitations of available data to accurately measure
the impact of local housing booms on the valuation of real estate assets owned by firms. First,
in financial statements, we are not able to disentangle the value of real estate assets from other
fixed assets, particularly equipment, for the vast majority of firms. As an alternative, we use
the relative value of tangible fixed assets over total assets as a proxy of the relative weight of
firms’ real estate in their assets. This is a plausible assumption given that our empirical strategy
relies on using geographical and time variation in the unit value of these tangible fixed assets
that we presume to be mainly driven by local changes in real estate prices over time rather
than changes in prices of the rest of fixed assets (equipment) included in this category. In
particular, we can presume that the dynamics of equipment prices should not exhibit significant
variation across firms within a competitive industry. In addition, in our empirical analysis we
include industry-year and location (province)-year fixed effects that should absorb unobserved
differences in the valuation change of tangible fixed assets not related with the dynamics of
local housing arkets.
Second, there are no price indices available at municipality level for each category of real
e tate ass ts that firms use to own. To overcome this limitation, we assume that real estate
markets at municipality level are synchronized and, thus, residential house prices are able to
capture the dynamics of the local markets on real estate assets owned by firms. This assumption
holds at the aggregate level, where evidence shows the co-movement of prices in real estate
markets. Indeed, Figure B.2 in Appendix B, shows that aggregate price indices on different real
estate assets (commercial real estate, offices and industry plants) are highly correlated with the
residential house price index (e.g., serial correlation among real estate price time series is above
0.90 over the period 2000-2012).
Third, financial statements do not provide detailed information on the geographical location
of real estate assets owned by firms. We assume that changes in the valuation of firms’ real estate
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collateral are driven by the changes in the value of real estate assets located in the municipality
where firms have their headquarters. This assumption seems reasonable given that in Spain
small and medium manufacturing firms represent roughly 99% of the census17, and they are
almost exclusively single-plants Almunia et al., 2018. In addition, although the probability of
holding real estate assets in different municipalities is higher among large firms, multi-plant
firms are a minority proportion even within this set of business.18 Lastly, evidence for the
U.S. shows that for multi-plant firms the location of headquarters tends to reveal a significant
proportion of the value of real estate assets owned by large firms Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar,
2012.
5 Empirical Analysis
This section discusses the identification strategy of our empirical analysis and reports the main
results of the paper. The specification of the empirical model to test the predictions stated in
section 3 is discussed in subsection 5.1, as well as the threads to identification. In subsection
5.2, we provide estimates on the causal impact of local house price shocks on the investment
rate of firms through a collateral channel. In subsection 5.3, we explore the causal impact
of this collateral channel on both the intensive and the extensive margin of credit allocation
among manufacturing firms. In subsection 5.4, we present estimates of regression specifications
that address specific sources of endogeneity that could bias our baseline estimates, and several
sensitivity analyses to evaluate the robustness of our results. The set of estimates discussed
below support the empirical relevance of the collateral channel on both investment and the
allocation of credit among manufacturing firms.
5.1 Specification and identification strategy
We test the predictions of the model using the panel of manufacturing firms that were active
during the Spanish housing boom (2003-2007) described in section 4. The model predicts
that when a housing boom occurs, the heterogeneous composition of collateralizable assets
among firms within an industry results in a heterogeneous borrowing capacity and differential
investment rates among them. In particular, when housing demand is above its fundamental
level, firms with a larger proportion of real estate assets benefit from a housing-driven boom
because the value of their collateral increases more than the collateral of firms in the same
industry but with a lower share of collateralizable real estate assets. At the same time, the
17Large firms are defined as the ones having more than 50 employees (full-time equivalent) and they represent
roughly 1% of manufacturing firms according to the Spanish National Statistical Office (see Almunia, Lopez-
Rodriguez and Moral-Benito, 2018.
18The prevalence of single-plant firms among Spanish manufacturing firms has also been discussed in Gopinath
et al. (2017). In particular, this paper argues that an official survey (Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales)
on large manufacturing firms over the housing boom in Spain indicates that just 15% of all large firms in this
sector are multi-plant firms. This small proportion of large firms is the same in the sample of manufacturing
firms that we use in our empirical analysis in section 5.
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model predicts that firms with the same relative composition of collateralizable assets are able
to borrow and invest more when they are located in geographical areas where house prices
increas relatively more. Considering this potential interaction between the relative composition
of collateralizable assets and the geographic location of firms, we consider the following empirical
model as our baseline specification:
Invimt = β0 + β1∆HPmt + β2Tangimt + β3∆HPmt ∗ Tangimt + β4X
′
imt + γi + δsrt + ϵimt, (4)
where Invimt is the investment rate of firm i located in municipality m in year t, that is
measured by the log difference of the stock of capital between years t−1 and t measured in real
terms; ∆HPmt is the log-difference of house prices between years t−1 and t in the municipality
m; Tangimt refers to tangibility rate measured as the share of tangible fixed assets to total
assets of firm i located in municipality m in year t; and X
′
imt is a vector of firms’ characteristics.
In order to enhance identification, we include firm fixed effects γi that control for unobserved
time-invariant firm’s characteristics; and a set δsrt of industry-region-year fixed effects. In a first
specification, we allow for industry-year fixed effects that control for industry-specific shocks
that affect firms within an industry, regardless of their composition of collateralizable assets and
their geographic location. In an extended specification, we include industry-region-year fixed
effects, in order to also abstract from location (region)-specific shocks that would affect all firms
within an industry during a year. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
The interpretation of this reduced form equation is based on the predictions of the stylized
model of investment, discussed in section 3, in which the composition of firms’ collateralizable
assets interacts with the geographic location of real estate assets.19 In particular, the coeffi-
cient β3 measures the differential effect of house prices growth on the investment rate of firms
depending on the tangibility of their collateral. In the presence of financial frictions, the model
predicts β3 > 0, that is, an increase in local house prices in a municipality raises, for the average
firm in the sample, the investment rate and this rate is higher the larger the tangibility of firm’s
assets. The elasticity of house prices growth to the investment rate of the average firm is thus
computed as β1 plus the interaction of β3 and the average share of firm’s tangible assets.
Equation 4 is informative about the potential effect of local housing booms on investment
but it is silent about the financial channel embedded in the model. In our stylized model,
firms are financially constrained and their borrowing constraint is related to the value of their
collateral. Thus, for a given house price shock, borrowing capacity of the firm increases with its
share of real estate assets. To test this financial channel hypothesis (prediction 2), we estimate
equation 4 but considering as the dependent variable the net credit growth ∆Cimt, measured as
19In line with Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012), the model justifies a specification that regress annual
investment rate on current values of the tangibility rate and house price growth. Conditional on repaying debt at
the end of a period, firms depend on the valuation of their collateral to obtain funds and invest in the subsequent
period.
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assets. The elasticity of house prices growth to the investment rate of the average firm is thus
computed as β1 plus the interaction of β3 and the average hare of firm’s ta gible ass t .
Equation 4 is informative about the potential effect of local housing booms on investment
but it is silent about the financial channel embedded in the model. In our stylized model,
firms are financially constrained and their borrowing constraint is related to the value of their
collateral. Thus, for a given house price shock, borrowing capacity of the firm increases with its
share of real estate assets. To test this financial channel hypothesis (prediction 2), we estimate
equation 4 but considering as the dependent variable the net credit growth ∆Cimt, measured as
19In line with Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012), the model justifies a specification that regress annual
investment rate on current values of the tangibility rate and house price growth. Conditional on repaying debt at
the end of a period, firms depend on the valuation of their collateral to obtain funds and invest in the subsequent
period.
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model predicts that firms with the same relative composition of collateralizable assets are able
to borrow and invest more when they are located in geographical areas where house prices
increase relatively more. Considering this potential interaction between the relative composition
of collateralizable assets and the geographic location of firms, we consider the following empirical
model as our baseline specification:
Invimt = β0 + β1∆HPmt + β2Tangimt + β3∆HPmt ∗ Tangimt + β4X
′
imt + γi + δsrt + ϵimt, (4)
where Invimt is the investment rate of firm i located in municipality m in year t, that is
measured by the log difference of the stock of capital between years t−1 and t measured in real
terms; ∆HPmt is the log-difference of house prices between years t−1 and t in the municipality
m; Tangimt refers to tangibility rate measured as the share of tangible fixed assets to total
assets of firm i located in municipality m in year t; and X
′
imt is a vector of firms’ characteristics.
In order to enhance identification, we include firm fixed effects γi that control for unobserved
time-invariant firm’s characteristics; and a set δsrt of industry-region-year fixed effects. In a first
specification, we allow for industry-year fixed effects that control for industry-specific shocks
that affect firms within an industry, regardless of their composition of collateralizable assets and
their geographic location. In an extended specification, we include industry-region-year fixed
effects, in order to also abstract from location (region)-specific shocks that would affect all firms
within an industry during a year. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
The interpretation of this reduced form equation is based on the predictions of the stylized
model of investment, discussed in section 3, in which the composition of firms’ collateralizable
assets interacts with the geographic location of real estate assets.19 In particular, the coeffi-
cient β3 measures the differential effect of house prices growth on the investment rate of firms
depending on the tangibility of their collateral. In the presence of financial frictions, the model
predicts β3 > 0, that is, an increase in local house prices in a municipality raises, for the average
firm in the sample, the investment rate and this rate is higher the larger the tangibility of firm’s
assets. The elasticity of house prices growth to the investment rate of the average firm is thus
computed as β1 plus the interaction of β3 and the average share of firm’s tangible assets.
Equation 4 is informative about the potential effect of local housing booms on investment
but it is silent about the financial channel embedded in the model. In our stylized model,
firms are financially constrained and their borrowing constraint is related to the value of their
collateral. Thus, for a given house price shock, borrowing capacity of the firm increases with its
share of real estate assets. To test this financial channel hypothesis (prediction 2), we estimate
equation 4 but considering as the dependent variable the net credit growth ∆Cimt, measured as
19In line with Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012), the model justifies a specification that regress annual
investment rate on current values of the tangibility rate and house price growth. Conditional on repaying debt at
the end of a period, firms depend on the valuation of their collateral to obtain funds and invest in the subsequent
period.
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the log difference of total banking outstanding credit in real terms between t− 1 and t of firm
i. The model also predicts β3 > 0, that is, firms within an industry located in municipalities
at experi nce higher house price apprecia ions rec ive more ba king credi the larger the
tangibility of their collateral.
The OLS estimates of equation 4 can be biased because the potential endogeneity of local
house prices. Indeed, house prices in a municipality can be positively correlated with firms’
investment opportunities, and these prices can proxy for local demand shocks. In order to
address this endogeneity concern, we adapt a broadly used empirical strategy in the macro and
finance literature that estimates the real effects of house price shocks.20 In particular, we run
a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimate of equation 4 where house prices at municipality level
are instrumented using a proxy of the pre-boom housing supply elasticity in the municipality
interacted with the aggregate long-term real interest rate of home mortgages. We use our
measure of the pre-boom buildable urban land ratio in a municipality, as described in section 4,
as a proxy of housing supply elasticity; and for the long-term real interest rate we use the rate
of the flow of yearly mortgage loans granted to households for the purchase of a house with an
initial mortgage term of more than 10 years, from the Bank of Spain between 2003 and 2007.
In order to show the relevance of our instrument, we run a first-stage regression at munici-
pality level over the period 2003-200721, such that,
∆HPmt = α0 + α1HSEm ∗∆Rt + λt + τm + ξmt, (5)
where ∆HPmt is the log difference of residential house price index in real terms between years
t − 1 and t in the municipality m; HSEm is the housing supply elasticity in municipality m,
measured by the buildable urban land ratio in a pre-boom year; ∆Rt is the difference in the
average long-term real interest rate of home mortgages at national level between years t−1 and
t; λt is a year fixed effect that captures aggregate shocks that could create macro-fluctuations
in house prices; and τm is a location (municipality) fixed effect that control for unobserved
time-invariant municipality characteristics.
According to economic theory, when there is an aggregate fall in the real long-term interest
rate of home mortgages, the demand for houses increases. In municipalities with a larger ratio
of pre-boom buildable urban land, the increase in housing demand can be absorbed to a greater
extent by housing supply through expanding construction. Instead, in municipalities with lower
buildable urban land ratio, the increase in housing demand pushed by a fall in real interest rates
20We follow the empirical strategy used, among others, by Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), Mian and
Sufi (2011), Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) or Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay (2018).
21This exercise aims just to illustrate the relevance of the instrument to predict the dynamic of house prices
across municipalities in Spain. In subsection 5.2, the 2SLS estimates will report each of the F-statistics of the
first-stage corresponding to the firm-level regression 4 in which every regressor that contains house price growth at
municipality level is instrumented with the interaction of pre-boom buildable urban land ratio in the municipality
and the real long-term interest rate.
23
the log difference of total banking outstanding credit in real terms between t− 1 and t of firm
i. The model also predicts β3 > 0, that is, firms within an industry located in municipalities
that experience higher house price appreciations receive more banking credit the larger the
tangibility of their collateral.
The OLS estimates of equation 4 can be biased because the potential endogeneity of local
house prices. Indeed, house prices in a municipality can be positively correlated with firms’
investment opportunities, and these prices can proxy for local demand shocks. In order to
address this endogeneity concern, we adapt a broadly used empirical strategy in the macro and
finance literature that estimates the real effects of house price shocks.20 In particular, we run
a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimate of equation 4 where house prices at municipality level
are instrumented using a proxy of the pre-boom housing supply elasticity in the municipality
interacted with the aggregate long-term real interest rate of home mortgages. We use our
measure of the pre-boom buildable urban land ratio in a municipality, as described in section 4,
as a proxy of housing supply elasticity; and for the long-term real interest rate we use the rate
of the flow of yearly mortgage loans granted to households for the purchase of a house with an
initial mortgage term of more than 10 years, from the Bank of Spain between 2003 and 2007.
In order to show the relevance of our instrument, we run a first-stage regression at munici-
pality level over the period 2003-200721, such that,
∆HPmt = α0 + α1HSEm ∗∆Rt + λt + τm + ξmt, (5)
where ∆HPmt is the log difference of residential house price index in real terms between years
t − 1 and t in the unicipality m; HSEm is the housing supply elasticity in municipality m,
measured by the buildable urban land ratio in a pre-boom year; ∆Rt is the difference in the
average long-term real interest rate of home mortgages at national level between years t−1 and
t; λt is a year fixed effect that captures aggregate shocks that could create macro-fluctuations
in house prices; and τm is a location (municipality) fixed effect that control for unobserved
time-invariant municipality characteristics.
According to economic theory, when there is an aggregate fall in the real long-term interest
rate of home mortgages, the demand for houses increases. In municipalities with a larger ratio
of pre-boom buildable urban land, the increase in housing demand can be absorbed to a greater
extent by housing supply through expanding construction. Instead, in municipalities with lower
buildable urban land ratio, the increase in housing demand pushed by a fall in real interest rates
20We follow the empir cal s rategy used, among others, by Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), Mian and
Sufi (2011), Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) or Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay (2018).
21This exercise aims just to illustrate the relevanc of the inst ument to predict the dynamic of house p ices
across municipalities in Spain. In subsection 5.2, the 2SLS estimates will report each of the F-statistics of the
first-stage corresponding to the firm-level regression 4 in which every regressor that contains house price growth at
municipality level is instrumented with the interaction of pre-boom buildable urban land ratio in the municipality
and the real long-term interest rate.
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the log difference of total banking outstanding credit in real terms between t− 1 and t of firm
i. The model also predicts β3 > 0, that is, firms within an industry located in municipalities
that experience higher house price appreciations receive more banking credit the larger the
tangibility of their collateral.
The OLS estimates of equation 4 can be biased because the potential endogeneity of local
house prices. Indeed, house prices in a municipality can be positively correlated with firms’
investment opportunities, and these prices can proxy for local demand shocks. In order to
address this endogeneity concern, we adapt a broadly used empirical strategy in the macro and
finance literature that estimates the real effects of house price shocks.20 In particular, we run
a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimate of equation 4 where house prices at municipality level
are instrumented using a proxy of the pre-boom housing supply elasticity in the municipality
interacted with the aggregate long-term real interest rate of home mortgages. We use our
measure of the pre-boom buildable urban land ratio in a municipality, as described in section 4,
as a proxy of housing supply elasticity; and for the long-term real interest rate we use the rate
of the flow of yearly mortgage loans granted to households for the purchase of a house with an
initial mortgage term of more than 10 years, from the Bank of Spain between 2003 and 2007.
In order to show the relevance of our instrument, we run a first-stage regression at munici-
pality level over the period 2003-200721, such that,
∆HPmt = α0 + α1HSEm ∗∆Rt + λt + τm + ξmt, (5)
where ∆HPmt is the log difference of residential house price index in real terms between years
t − 1 and t in the municipality m; HSEm is the housing supply elasticity in municipality m,
measured by the buildable urban land ratio in a pre-boom year; ∆Rt is the difference in the
average long-term real interest rate of home mortgages at national level between years t−1 and
t; λt is a year fixed effect that captures aggregate shocks that could create macro-fluctuations
in house prices; and τm is a location (municipality) fixed effect that control for unobserved
time-invariant municipality characteristics.
According to economic theory, when there is an aggregate fall in the real long-term interest
rate of home mortgages, the demand for houses increases. In municipalities with a larger ratio
of pre-boom buildable urban land, the increase in housing demand can be absorbed to a greater
extent by housing supply through expanding construction. Instead, in municipalities with lower
buildable urban land ratio, the increase in housing demand pushed by a fall in real interest rates
20We follow the empirical strategy used, among others, by Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), Mian and
Sufi (2011), Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) or Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay (2018).
21This exercise aims just to illustrate the relevance of the instrument to predict the dynamic of house prices
across municipalities in Spain. In subsection 5.2, the 2SLS estimates will report each of the F-statistics of the
first-stage corresponding to the firm-level regression 4 in which every regressor that contains house price growth at
municipality level is instrumented with the interaction of pre-boom buildable urban land ratio in the municipality
and the real long-term interest rate.
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cannot be fully absorbed by supply and, thus, translate into higher house prices. At the same
time, in the presence of a housing boom across municipalities, an increase of the real interest rate
to curb housing demand would be more effective in municipalities with higher housing supply
elasticity. We thus expect a negative sign in the coefficient α1, given that during a housing
boom surg n the real interest ra should have a larger effect in mitigati g ho se rice
increases in municipalities with larger buildable urban land availability. In particular, a more
positive interaction term (larger real rate increase times higher positive pre-boom buildable
urban land measure) is associated with a lower positive residential house price increase, and
hence the negative coefficient. Table 2 reports the estimates of the equation 5 using proxies for
the housing supply elasticity at municipality level for several pre-boom years (1995, 1996, 1997
and 1998). Estimates shows that the coefficient associated to α1 is negative and significant
at the 1% level for the proxy of the housing supply elasticity in different pre-boom years.22
The resulting F-test for the nullity of the instrument are above 10 (see Stock and Yogo, 2005),
indicating the relevance of instrument and its predictive power on house prices at municipality
level.
Turning to identification, in the next subsection we provide 2SLS estimates that rely on
the assumption that, when a housing boom occurs, pre-boom buildable urban land availability
determines the size of the change in house prices at the municipality level, but it is exogenous
to firm investment decisions during the boom. This identification strategy is enhanced with the
inclusion of the set of fixed effects discussed above, but it is still thread by specific sources of
endogeneity and omitted variables that could bias estimates. In subsection 5.4 we will discuss
how the inclusion of a vector X
′
imt of firms’ characteristics could mitigate the existence of these
potential biases.
5.2 Investment and the housing boom
Table 3 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation 4 for the baseline sample of manufacturing
firms. This sample includes firms that i) are active in at least one year in the housing boom
period (2003-2007); ii) have positive stock of capital in the years included in the sample; and iii)
are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of housing
supply elasticities are available.
The OLS estimates (reported in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3) are consistent with the main
prediction of the model. The coefficient on the interaction between local house price growth and
the share of tangible fixed assets is positive and significant at the 1% level in all specifications.
These estimates point out that the investment rate of the average firm increases when local
house prices raise, and the larger the tangibility of firm’s assets the higher the increase in the
22In what follows, we use the proxy of the housing supply elasticity in 1997 in order to maximize the coverage
of our estimation sample. The estimates provided in the next sections using the 1997 measure are robust when
considering alternative pre-boom years to measure the constraints in the buildable urban land of municipalities.
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Turning to identification, in the next subsection we provide 2SLS estimates that rely on
the assumption that, when a housing boom occurs, pre-boom buildable urban land availability
determines the size of the change in house prices at the municipality level, but it is exogenous
to firm investment decisions during the boom. This identification strategy is enhanced with the
inclusion of the set of fixed effects discussed above, but it is still thread by specific sources of
endogeneity and omitted variables that could bias estimates. In subsection 5.4 we will discuss
how the inclusion of a vector X
′
imt of firms’ characteristics could mitigate the existence of these
potential biases.
5.2 Investment and the housing boom
Table 3 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation 4 for the baseline sample of manufacturing
firms. This sample includes firms that i) are active in at least one year in the housing boom
period (2003-2007); ii) have positive stock of capital in the years included in the sample; and iii)
are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of housing
supply elasticities are available.
The OLS estimates (reported in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3) are consistent with the main
prediction of the model. The coefficient on the interaction between local house price growth and
the share of tangible fixed assets is positive and significant at the 1% level in all specifications.
These estimates point out that the investment rate of the average firm increases when local
house prices raise, and the larger the tangibility of firm’s assets the higher the increase in the
22In what follows, we use the proxy of the housing supply elasticity in 1997 in order to maximize the coverage
of our estimation sample. The estimates provided in the next sections using the 1997 measure are robust when
considering alternative pre-boom years to measure the constraints in the buildable urban land of municipalities.
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cannot be fully absorbed by supply and, thus, translate into higher house prices. At the same
time, in the presence of a housing boom across municipalities, an increase of the real interest rate
to curb housing demand would be more effective in municipalities with higher housing supply
elasticity. We thus expect a negative sign in the coefficient α1, given that during a housing
boom a surge in the real interest rate should have a larger effect in mitigating house price
increases in municipalities with larger buildable urban land availability. In particular, a more
positive interaction term (larger real rate increase times higher positive pre-boom buildable
urban land measure) is associated with a lower positive residential house price increase, and
hence the negative coefficient. Table 2 reports the estimates of the equation 5 using proxies for
the housing supply elasticity at municipality level for several pre-boom years (1995, 1996, 1997
and 1998). Estimates shows that the coefficient associated to α1 is negative and significant
at the 1% level for the proxy of the housing supply elasticity in different pre-boom years.22
The resulting F-test for the nullity of the instrument are above 10 (see Stock and Yogo, 2005),
indicating the relevance of instrument and its predictive power on house prices at municipality
level.
Turning to identification, in the next subsection we provide 2SLS estimates that rely on
the assumption that, when a housing boom occurs, pre-boom buildable urban land availability
determines the size of the change in house prices at the municipality level, but it is exogenous
to firm investment decisions during the boom. This identification strategy is enhanced with the
inclusion of the set of fixed effects discussed above, but it is still thread by specific sources of
endogeneity and omitted variables that could bias estimates. In subsection 5.4 we will discuss
how the inclusion of a vector X
′
imt of firms’ characteristics could mitigate the existence of these
potential biases.
5.2 Investment and the housing boom
Table 3 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of equation 4 for the baseline sample of manufacturing
firms. This sample includes firms that i) are active in at least one year in the housing boom
period (2003-2007); ii) have positive stock of capital in the years included in the sample; and iii)
are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of housing
supply elasticities are available.
The OLS estimates (reported in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3) are consistent with the main
prediction of the model. The coefficient on the interaction between local house price growth and
the share of tangible fixed assets is positive and significant at the 1% level in all specifications.
These estimates point out that the investment rate of the average firm increases when local
house prices raise, and the larger the tangibility of firm’s assets the higher the increase in the
22In what follows, we use the proxy of the housing supply elasticity in 1997 in order to maximize the coverage
of our estimation sample. The estimates provided in the next sections using the 1997 measure are robust when
considering alternative pre-boom years to measure the constraints in the buildable urban land of municipalities.
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investment rate. The results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects and different sets of
industry-location-time fixed effects. The discussion that follows of the empirical results focuses
on our prefer ed specification that includ s industry-reg on-year fixed effects to abstract from
location-specific shocks that could affect all firms within an industry during a given year.
According to the OLS estimates corresponding to our preferred specification, column (3),
the elasticity of house prices growth to the investment rate is -0.04 when the firm has no
tangible fixed assets and 0.13 when 100% of firm’s assets value are real state assets. Note that
these elasticities imply that firms with no real estate assets may be forced to cut investment
during housing booms. Quantitatively, these price elasticities imply that moving from the 25th
percentile of the share of tangible fixed assets distribution to the 75th percentile, increases the
investment rate by 4 pp. (0.13x0.31), which represents 45% of the average yearly investment
growth rate in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1).
The OLS estimates of the house price-investment elasticity can be downward biased by the
potential positive correlation between house prices and investment opportunities. Thus, the
endogeneity of house prices and the potential biases created imply that the OLS estimates
can be considered as a lower bound on the impact of local housing-driven shocks on firms’
collateral on investment. To overcome this limitation, we adopt an identification strategy based
on instrumental variables as discussed above in order to investigate the causal relation between
local house prices and investment. The two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates of equation (3)
are reported in columns 4 to 6 of Table 3. In these specifications, local house price growth is
instrumented by the interaction between pre-boom urban land availability in the municipality
and the aggregate long-term real interest rate of home mortgages. This instrumental variables
strategy assumes that initial geographic conditions predict the size of the house price change,
and these initial conditions are exogenous to firm investment decisions during the housing
boom. The resulting F-tests reported in Table 3 for the nullity of the instruments are above
10, indicating the relevance of the instrument and its predictive power on house price growth
in the sample of manufacturing firms.23
The 2SLS estimates indicate that the main prediction of the model on the connection of house
prices and investment through the collateral channel holds empirically. Indeed, the coefficient
of the interaction term remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Compared
to the OLS estimates discussed above, the 2SLS coefficient estimates of the interaction term
are larger in magnitude, in line with the expected negative sign of the bias created by the
endogeneity issues. In particular, the results from our preferred specification, column (6), show
a house price-investment elasticity for the average manufacturing firm of 0.13, given that the
mean tangibility rate in the manufacturing sector is 0.28. This elasticity means that a 1%
23Tables that report 2SLS estimates include F-statistics of the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification
tests in the presence of multiple regressors. These statistics refer to the corresponding test for the null hypothesis
that the first-stage coefficients equal zero.
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investment rate. The results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects and different sets of
industry-location-time fixed effects. The discussion that follows of the empirical results focuses
on our preferred specification that includes industry-region-year fixed effects to abstract from
location-specific shocks that could affect all firms within an industry during a given year.
According to the OLS estimates corresponding to our preferred specification, column (3),
the elasticity of house prices growth to the investment rate is -0.04 when the firm has no
tangible fixed assets and 0.13 when 100% of fir ’s assets value are real state assets. Note that
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during housing booms. Quantitatively, these price elasticities imply that moving from the 25th
percentile of the share of tangible fixed assets distribution to the 75th percentile, increases the
investment rate by 4 pp. (0.13x0.31), which represents 45% of the average yearly investment
growth rate in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1).
The OLS estimates of the house price-investment elasticity can be downward biased by the
potential positive correlation between house prices and investment opportunities. Thus, the
endogeneity of house prices and the potential biases created imply that the OLS estimates
can be considered as a lower bound on the impact of local housing-driven shocks on firms’
collateral on investment. To overcome this limitation, we adopt an identification strategy based
on instrumental variables as discussed above in order to investigate the causal relation between
local house prices and investment. The two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates of equation (3)
are reported in columns 4 to 6 of Table 3. In these specifications, local house price growth is
instrumented by the interaction between pre-boom urban land availability in the municipality
and the aggregate long-term real interest rate of home mortgages. This instrumental variables
strategy assumes that initial geographic conditions predict the size of the house price change,
and these initial conditions are exogenous to firm investment decisions during the housing
boom. The resulting F-tests reported in Table 3 for the nullity of the instruments are above
10, indicating the relevance of the instrument and its predictive power on house price growth
in the sample of manufacturing firms.23
The 2SLS estimates indicate that the main prediction of the model on the connection of house
prices and i vestment through t e collateral channel holds empirically. I deed, the coefficient
of t e interaction term remai s positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Compared
to the OLS estimates discussed above, the 2SLS coefficient estimates of the interaction term
are larger in magnitude, in line with the expected negative sign of the bias created by the
endogeneity issues. In particular, the results from our preferred specification, column (6), show
a house price-investment elasticity for the average manufacturing firm of 0.13, given that the
mean tangibility rate in the manufacturing sector is 0.28. This elasticity means that a 1%
23Tables that report 2SLS estimates include F-statistics of the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification
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that the first-stage coefficients equal zero.
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investment rate. The results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects and different sets of
industry-location-time fixed effects. The discussion that follows of the empirical results focuses
on our preferred specification that includes industry-region-year fixed effects to abstract from
location-specific shocks that could affect all firms within an industry during a given year.
According to the OLS estimates corresponding to our preferred specification, column (3),
the elasticity of house prices growth to the investment rate is -0.04 when the firm has no
tangible fixed assets and 0.13 when 100% of firm’s assets value are real state assets. Note that
these elasticities imply that firms with no real estate assets may be forced to cut investment
during housing booms. Quantitatively, these price elasticities imply that moving from the 25th
percentile of the share of tangible fixed assets distribution to the 75th percentile, increases the
investment rate by 4 pp. (0.13x0.31), which represents 45% of the average yearly investment
growth rate in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1).
The OLS estimates of the house price-investment elasticity can be downward biased by the
potential positive correlation between house prices and investment opportunities. Thus, the
endogeneity of house prices and the potential biases created imply that the OLS estimates
can be considered as a lower bound on the impact of local housing-driven shocks on firms’
collateral on investment. To overcome this limitation, we adopt an identification strategy based
on instrumental variables as discussed above in order to investigate the causal relation between
local house prices and investment. The two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates of equation (3)
are reported in columns 4 to 6 of Table 3. In these specifications, local house price growth is
instrumented by the interaction between pre-boom urban land availability in the municipality
and the aggregate long-term real interest rate of home mortgages. This instrumental variables
strategy assumes that initial geographic conditions predict the size of the house price change,
and these initial conditions are exogenous to firm investment decisions during the housing
boom. The resulting F-tests reported in Table 3 for the nullity of the instruments are above
10, indicating the relevance of the instrument and its predictive power on house price growth
in the sample of manufacturing firms.23
The 2SLS estimates indicate that the main prediction of the model on the connection of house
prices and investment through the collateral channel holds empirically. Indeed, the coefficient
of the interaction term remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Compared
to the OLS estimates discussed above, the 2SLS coefficient estimates of the interaction term
are larger in magnitude, in line with the expected negative sign of the bias created by the
endogeneity issues. In particular, the results from our preferred specification, column (6), show
a house price-investment elasticity for the average manufacturing firm of 0.13, given that the
mean tangibility rate in the manufacturing sector is 0.28. This elasticity means that a 1%
23Tables that report 2SLS estimates include F-statistics of the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification
tests in the presence of multiple regressors. These statistics refer to the corresponding test for the null hypothesis
that the first-stage coefficients equal zero.
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increase in local house prices leads to a 13% raise in the investment rate for the average firm,
in a context of a housing boom where average local house prices rises yearly at 14%.24
The potential causal heterogeneous impact of local house price shocks on the accumulation
of capital can be illustrated examining the different investment elasticities according to the
firms’ distribution of the tangibility rate. For instance, given the same local house price shock,
manufacturing firms located in the 75th percentile of the distribution of the share of tangible
fixed assets would invest 98 pp more than manufacturing firms in the bottom 25th percentile of
this distribution. At the same time, the elasticity of house prices growth to the investment rate is
close to 0 for manufacturing firms with the median tangibility rate (0.234). This results points
out that firms with relatively low tangibility rates, in the presence of the collateral channel,
could be forced to cut investment during housing booms.
The results discussed in this section can be interpreted as a first evidence of capital mis-
allocation through the lens of our model. Indeed, once we control for unobserved fixed firms’
characteristics as well as different industry, time and location fixed effects, firms’ investment
rates within manufacturing industries should not depend neither on the composition of fixed
assets nor on the specific geographic location of firms. In contrast, the results discussed in this
section point out that a positive local house price shock creates differential investment rates
within an industry that are positively related with the tangibility rate of the firms. At the
same time, considering the share of real estate assets across firms, the investment rates in a
given industry depend on the location of firms across the geography, i.e. firms located in land-
constrained municipalities experiencing a larger house price boom accumulate more capital that
firms with the same tangibility rate operating in the same industry.
5.3 The credit channel
In this subsection, we explore the potential financial mechanism that can fuel the heterogeneous
investment patterns associated to the collateral channel documented in the previous section. In
the presence of financial frictions, our model predicts that borrowing capacity of firms depends
on the value of their collateral. In this framework, the connection of house prices and credit
allocation is a source of capital misallocation through the collateral channel. In order to empir-
ically explore these predictions, we first examine the impact of local house price shocks in the
intensive margin of credit following the empirical strategy discussed in subsection 5.1. Then, we
provide some suggestive evidence on the potential impact of the collateral channel on different
measures that can proxy the extensive margin of credit, as would be discussed below.
24In order to put this result in the context of the literature, we consider the main estimate reported in Chaney,
Sraer and Thesmar (2012) that situates the house price - investment elasticity at 6% for the average firm in the
U.S. The larger magnitude of the elasticity for Spanish manufacturing firms could be consistent with an economy
with larger financial frictions where small and medium firms are more dependent to collateralizable assets to
obtain credit in order to fund their investment projects (see discussion in subsection 5.3)
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Table 4 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of the equation 4, for the baseline sample of
manufacturing firms that have outstanding debt with the banking sector, using now net credit
growth as the dependent variable instead of the investment rate. The net credit growth is
measured as the log yearly difference of total banking outstanding credit in real terms.
The OLS estimates (reported in columns 1 to 3 of Table 4) cannot reject the prediction
of the model that relates the allocation of credit by the banking sector with the tangibility of
firms’ collateral. In all the OLS specifications, the coefficients on the interaction term between
the tangibility rate and the local house price growth are positive and significant at the 1%
level. The OLS estimates of the house price elasticity for credit in the manufacturing sector are
quantitatively similar to the ones obtained for the investment rate. For instance, the relative
scarcity of real estate assets that can be used as collateral (e.g. a tangibility rate in the first
quartile of the distribution) is correlated with a reduction in the allocation of credit among
manufacturing firms by the banking sector.
The endogeneity concerns on house prices, discussed above with detail, can also downward
bias the price elasticity of credit. In order to overcome this bias, the 2SLS estimates reported in
Table 4 (columns 4 to 6) result from the instrumental variables strategy discussed in subection
5.1. This empirical strategy aims to examine the causal relationship between local house price
shocks and corporate credit. The results on the F-tests show, in the first place, the relevance
of the proposed instrument also in the sample of manufacturing firms that have outstanding
debt with the banking sector. Second, the second-stage estimates on the interaction term,
once we control for firm fixed effects and different sets of industry-location-time fixed effects,
point out that firms within an industry located in municipalities that experience higher house
price appreciations receive more banking credit the larger the tangibility of their collateral. In
particular, the estimates reported in our preferred specification (column 6) show a quantitatively
and statistically significant house price-credit elasticity for the average manufacturing firm of
0.29. The elasticity for the median manufacturing firm is also relevant and stands at 0.21.
The 2SLS estimates indicate that the magnitude of the impact of local house prices shocks
on credit is slightly larger than the impact on investment discussed above. The larger impact
is noticeable in terms of comparing the house price elasticity of the average manufacturing firm
(0.29 for credit versus 0.13 for investment). This sizeable elasticity of credit at firm level in a
context of high house price appreciations is compatible with the quick rise in the leverage ratio
observed in the Spanish manufacturing sector over these years.
The heterogeneous impact of local house prices on corporate credit is also relevant in terms
of the distribution of collateralizable real estate assets. For instance, the effect of moving a firm
from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the tangibility rate distribution implies an additional
credit growth rate of 53pp for the same local house price shock. Taking together, this evidence on
the differential allocation of credit related to the relative value of real estate assets is consistent
with the hypothesis that the collateral channel is a relevant mechanism through which house
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prices distort the allocation of capital. In particular, the results point out a misallocation of
banking credit within manufacturing industries toward i) firms located in areas with larger local
house prices shocks; and ii) firms with a larger share of collateralizable real estate assets.
As a complementary result, in Table 5 we provide suggestive evidence on the potential
impact of local house price shocks on the extensive margin of credit. To examine this channel,
we focus on firms that had a credit relation with at least one bank in the years of the housing
boom, and then examine whether the collateral channel affects the probability of having new
bank relationships. We consider the baseline specification in equation 4 but now we use three
alternative discrete dependent variables. In particular, dependent variable in columns 1 and 2
is a dummy that takes value 1 for firm i when at least one new loan application is accepted by
a bank; dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the number of new loan applications of firm
i that are accepted by banks; and dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is the proportion of
new loans over the total number of loans granted by banks to firm i.
The OLS estimates of the coefficient on the interaction term in linear probability model
(LPM)25 in Table 5 (column 1) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This
results suggest that firms in booming municipalities and with more tangible assets had higher
likelihood of starting a new loan relationship with a bank. The 2SLS of the LMP (column 2) aims
to deal with the potential downward bias in the estimated coefficient created by the endogeneity
of house prices. In spite of the relevance and significant predictive capacity of the instrument,
as revealed by the F-tests associated to the first-stage coefficients, the increase in the standard
errors makes the larger coefficient of the interaction term not statistically significant. However,
the 2SLS estimates of the interaction term in specifications that use alternative measures of the
extensive margin of credit are quantitatively and statistically significant at 5% (columns 4 and
6). The estimates show that local house price shocks had increase more both the number of new
loans and the proportion of new loans over total loans for firms that had a larger proportion of
real estate assets that are collateralizable. Thus, even though the picture is more nuanced, the
results are consistent with an impact of the collateral channel on misallocation of credit also at
the extensive margin.
5.4 Robustness
In this subsection we present estimates of our reduced form regressions that address some spe-
cific sources of endogeneity that could bias the 2SLS estimates of the house price elasticities
discussed in subsections 5.2 and 5.3. The sensitivity analysis focuses on the preferred specifica-
tion of equation 4 that includes firm fixed effects and industry-region-year fixed effects. We first
explore the heterogeneity of the collateral channel among firms that can be concealed in the
25The adoption of a linear probability model has the advantage, compared with other discrete choice models,
that estimates would not be affected by an incidental parameters problem when controlling for a wide range of
fixed effects, as is the case in our preferred specification.
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average estimates. Then, we address specific sources of endogeneity and expand our baseline
specification in order to control for other confounding factors that can bias our results. Finally,
we undertake further robustness t st .
5.4.1 Heterogeneous responses
In this subsection, we explore the potential heterogeneity of our main results depending on firm
size, as well as the differential effect depending on the legal nature of banks that provided credit
to manufacturing firms.
Firm size. Financial constraints and investment decisions can be related with firm size
and, thus, the relevance of the collateral channel on capital misallocation can be heterogeneous
across firms depending on their size. In this case, pooling firms together without considering
their size might conceal the potential heterogeneity of the collateral channel across firms. We
undertake three empirical exercises that consider different measures of firm size in order to
explore the impact of these potential heterogeneous responses of investment and credit to local
house price shocks.
In the first place, we examine the relevance of the firm size as an additional confounder that
can explain the dynamics of investment and credit over the life cycle of the firm. In Tables 6
and 7 we report our baseline specifications for investment and credit, respectively, but adding
as control firm-specific yearly measures of the log firm size during the housing boom. The log
firm size is computed using three alternative measures: the average employment (columns 1
and 2), total sales in real terms (columns 3 and 4) and total assets in real terms (columns 5 and
6). As expected, these controls have a significant and positive effect on investment and credit
growth. However, when introducing these firm size controls, our OLS and 2SLS estimates are
very robust with minor changes in the house price elasticities of investment and credit.
In the second place, the aggregate relevance of the collateral channel depends on their
prevalence beyond the segment of the smallest firms that may be more financially constrained
but have a lesser impact on capital accumulation in the economy. In order to explore this
relevance, we examine whether our main results in Tables 3 and 4 change if we use weighted
least squares (WLS) to estimate the reduce-form equations. We weight firms according to
the three firm size measures discussed above but now taking the log of the average firm size
(employment, sales and assets) during the housing boom (2003-2007). The WLS and the 2SLS
estimates, using the same weights, reported in Tables 8 and 9, indicate that the weighting of
observations has a small quantitative impact on the coefficients of interest, as well as maintaining
statistical significance and, thus, not being able to reject the predictions of the model on the
collateral channel.
Finally, as additional robustness test, included in Appendix C.2, we divide the sample of
manufacturing firms in three subsamples depending on their size, as measured by their average
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employment during the housing boom. In particular, we label as small firms those that have
between 1 and 20 employees; as medium firms the ones between 21 and 49 employees; and
as large firms when they have 50 or more employees. The 2SLS estimates reported in Tables
C.2 and C.3 seem to indicate a stronger collateral channel on the segment of medium firms
that, compared to the average response, exhibit significantly larger house price elasticities of
both investment and credit. The 2SLS estimates of the coefficient associated to the interaction
term for large firms maintain the positive sign, but they do not have statistical significance.
Nevertheless, the estimates on this segment of firms should be considered with caution given
the F-tests associated to the first-stage that point out to a weak instruments problem that lead
to unreliable point estimates.
The main provider of credit. According to influential research on the determinants
of the Spanish housing boom (see Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos, 2013, Santos,
2014), politically-oriented saving banks played a prominent role in shaping the credit cycle.
In particular, the mismanagement of savings banks could explain to a large extent extent the
buildup and bust of the credit boom because these financial institutions had allocated credit to
riskier borrowers (households and firms) due to the connection between house prices dynamics
and their lending capacity. Thus, a potential concern is that our findings on credit misallocation
across firms may be mainly driven by the lending policies of the savings banks that could have
allocated credit to a particular segment of manufacturing firms. In order to address this potential
concern, Table 10 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates on the credit channel separating our baseline
sample of manufacturing firms into two subsamples of firms according to whether their main
source of credit comes from commercial banks (columns 1 and 2) or savings banks (columns
3 and 4). The 2SLS estimates in columns (2) and (4) indicate that in both subsamples the
coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant and, most relevant,
it is only marginally different and not statistically different between the two subsamples. In
addition, the 2SLS estimates show that we cannot reject the hypotheses that the house price
elasticity of credit for the average firm whose main provider of credit is a commercial bank is
larger than the mean elasticity for the whole sample of manufacturing firms. These results imply
that neither the significance nor the magnitude of the credit misallocation of the manufacturing
sector seems to come from a particular lending policy of the savings banks on this segment of
the credit market.26
5.4.2 Controlling for additional confounding factors
One potential concern with the main estimates discussed in subsections 5.2 and 5.3 is that
time-varying firm variables that are not constant at the industry-region-year level could be
associated with both investment (or credit) and tangibility (the valuation of collateral) of firms
26This evidence refers to manufacturing industries and therefore does not reject the potential role of savings
banks in the salient credit boom of the construction and real estate sectors, as well as in the household mortgage
market during the period 2003-2007.
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to unreliable point estimates.
The ain provider of credit. According to influential research on the determinants
of the Spanish housing boom (see Fernández-Villaverde, Garicano and Santos, 2013, Santos,
2014), politically-oriented saving banks played a prominent role in shaping the credit cycle.
In particular, the mismanagement of savings banks could explain to a large extent extent the
buildup and bust of the credit boom because these financial institutions had allocated credit to
riskier borrowers (households and firms) due to the connection between house prices dynamics
and their lending capacity. Thus, a potential concern is that our findings on credit misallocation
across firms may be mainly driven by the lending policies of the savings banks that could have
allocated credit to a particular segment of manufacturing firms. In order to address this potential
concern, Table 10 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates on the credit channel separating our baseline
sample of manufacturing firms into t o subsa ples of firms according to whether their ain
source of credit comes from commercial banks (columns 1 and 2) or savings banks (columns
3 and 4). The 2SLS estimates in columns (2) and (4) indicate that in both subsamples the
coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant and, most relevant,
it is only marginally different and not statistically different between the two subsamples. In
addition, the 2SLS estimates show that we cannot reject the hypotheses that the house price
elasticity of credit for the average firm whose main provider of credit is a commercial bank is
larger than the ean elasticity for the whole sample of manufacturing firms. These results imply
that neither the significance nor the magnitude of the credit misallocation of the manufacturing
sector seems to come from a particular lending policy of the savings banks on this segment of
the credit market.26
5.4.2 Controlling for additional confounding factors
One potential concern with the main estimates discussed in subsections 5.2 and 5.3 is that
time-varying firm variables that are not constant at the industry-region-year level could be
associated with both investment (or credit) and tangibility (the valuation of collateral) of firms
26This evidence refers to manufacturing industries and therefore does not reject the potential role of savings
banks in the salient credit boom of the construction and real estate sectors, as well as in the household mortgage
market during the period 2003-2007.
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in both positive and negative ways. In addition, the existence of these unobserved deter inants
of investment and credit could also be related with our instrument, thus creating biases in our
2SLS estimates. Indeed, not considering these confounding factors in our baseline specification
could create an omitted bias that would raise questions on the consistency of our estimates. In
order to address these concerns, we add several covariates into o r baseli e specification aiming
to control for additional confounding factors. In particular, among the potential time-varying
characteristics, that are not captured with firm fixed effects, we separately add three covariates
at firm-level: i) the log of the leverage ratio, measured as the ratio of total outstanding debt
over the book value of assets; ii) the log of financial costs, computed as the ratio f financial
expenditures over total outstanding debt; and iii) the log productivity of the firm, measured as
the TFP-sales estimated adopting the procedure proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
Tables 11 and 12 report OLS and 2SLS estimates of the investment and the credit reduced-
form equations, respectively, for our preferred specification once we include, separately, these
confounding factors. The results show that, conditional on firms’ financial conditions and pro-
ductivity shocks, the relevant coefficient associated with the interaction term remains positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications.
The inclusion of controls that proxy for time-varying firms’ financial conditions (leverage
ratio and financial costs) has a modest impact on the average house-price elasticities of in-
vestment and credit, but the dispersion of capital accumulation significantly increases. Indeed,
including these confounding factors broadens the gap of the differential impact of house price
shocks on both credit and investment between firms located at the top and the bottom of the
distribution of collateralizable real estate assets. For instance, once we control for the log lever-
age ratio, the effect of moving a firm from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the tangibility
rate distribution implies an additional investment (credit) growth rate of 124pp (80pp) for the
same local house price shock.27 In addition, considering the financial conditions of the firms,
the results reinforce the possibility that, in the presence of the collateral channel, firms with
relatively low tangibility rates could be forced to cut investment and may face credit rationing
during housing booms. The coefficients associated to these financial covariates are statistically
significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The impact of the leverage ratio on both invest-
ment and credit growth rates is positive, indicating a conditional positive correlation between
capital accumulation and the relative indebtedness of the firm during the housing boom. The
sign of the coefficient associated to financial costs in the investment equation is negative, as
would be theoretically expected given that a higher cost of funding should be negatively cor-
related with investment dynamics. Instead, the conditional correlation between financial costs
and credit growth is positive suggesting a higher pricing (spread) of the banking sector on firms
27The differential gap of the same quantitative exercise, controlling for the log of financial costs, reaches 121pp
for investment and 62pp for credit. Instead, the incremental growth rates for investment and credit, without
additional controls are, respectively, 98pp and 53pp.
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in both positive and negative ways. In addition, the existence of these unobserved determinants
of investment and credit could also be related with our instrument, thus creating biases in our
2SLS estimates. Indeed, not considering these confounding factors in our baseline specification
could create an omitted bias that would raise questions on the consistency of our estimates. In
order to address these concerns, we add several covariates into our baseline specification aiming
to control for additional confounding factors. In particular, among the potential time-varying
characteristics, that are not captured with firm fixed effects, we separately add three covariates
at firm-level: i) the log of the leverage ratio, measured as the ratio of total outstanding debt
over the book value of assets; ii) the log of financial costs, computed as the ratio of financial
expenditures over total outstanding debt; and iii) the log productivity of the firm, measured as
the TFP-sales estimated adopting the procedure proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
Tables 11 and 12 report OLS and 2SLS estimates of the investment and the credit reduced-
form equations, respectively, for our preferred specification once we include, separately, these
confounding factors. The results show that, conditional on firms’ financial conditions and pro-
ductivity shocks, the relevant coefficient associated with the interaction term remains positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications.
The inclusion of controls that proxy for time-varying firms’ financial conditions (leverage
ratio and financial costs) has a modest impact on the average house-price elasticities of in-
vestment and credit, but the dispersion of capital accumulation significantly increases. Indeed,
including these confounding factors broadens the gap of the differential impact of house price
shocks on both credit and investment between firms located at the top and the bottom of the
distribution of collateralizable real estate assets. For instance, once we control for the log lever-
age ratio, the effect of moving a firm from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the tangibility
rate distribution implies an additional investment (credit) growth rate of 124pp (80pp) for the
same local house price shock.27 In addition, considering the financial conditions of the firms,
the results reinforce the possibility that, in the presence of the collateral channel, firms with
relatively low tangibility rates could be forced to cut investment and may face credit rationing
during housing booms. The coefficients associated to these financial covariates are statistically
significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The impact of the leverage ratio on both invest-
ment and credit growth rates is positive, indicating a conditional positive correlation between
capital accumulation and the relative indebtedness of the firm during the housing boom. The
sign of the coefficient associated to financial costs in the investment equation is negative, as
would be theoretically expected given that a higher cost of funding should be negatively cor-
related with investment dynamics. Instead, the conditional correlation between financial costs
and credit growth is positive suggesting a higher pricing (spread) of the banking sector on firms
27The differential gap of the same quantitative exercise, controlling for the log of financial costs, reaches 121pp
for investment and 62pp for credit. Instead, the incremental growth rates for investment and credit, without
additional controls are, respectively, 98pp and 53pp.
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in both positive and negative ways. In addition, the existence of these unobserved determinants
of investment and credit could also be related with our instru ent, thus creating biases in our
2SLS estimates. Indeed, not considering these confounding factors in our baseline specification
could create an omitted bias that would raise questions on the consistency of our estimates. In
order to address these concerns, we add several covariates into our baseline specification aiming
to control for additional confounding factors. In particular, among the potential time-varying
characteristics, that are not captured with firm fixed effects, we separately add three covariates
at firm-level: i) the log of the leverage ratio, measured as the ratio of total outstanding debt
over the book value of assets; ii) the log of financial costs, computed as the ratio of financial
expenditures over total outstanding debt; and iii) the log productivity of the firm, measured as
the TFP-sales estimated adopting the procedure proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
Tables 11 and 12 report OLS and 2SLS estimates of the investment and the credit reduced-
form equations, respectively, for our preferred specification once we include, separately, these
confounding factors. The results show that, conditional on firms’ financial conditions and pro-
ductivity shocks, the relevant coefficient associated with the interaction term remains positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications.
The inclusion of controls that proxy for time-varying firms’ financial conditions (leverage
ratio and financial costs) has a modest impact on the average house-price elasticities of in-
vestment and credit, but the dispersion of capital accumulation significantly increases. Indeed,
including these confounding factors broadens the gap of the differential impact of house price
shocks on both credit and investment between firms located at the top and the bottom of the
distribution of collateralizable real estate assets. For instance, once we control for the log lever-
age ratio, the effect of moving a firm from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the tangibility
rate distribution implies an additional investment (credit) growth rate of 124pp (80pp) for the
same local house price shock.27 In addition, considering the financial conditions of the firms,
the results reinforce the possibility that, in the presence of the collateral channel, firms ith
relatively low tangibility rates could be forced to cut investment and may face credit rationing
during housing booms. The coefficients associated to these financial covariates are statistically
significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The impact of the leverage ratio on both invest-
ment and credit growth rates is positive, indicating a conditional positive correlation between
capital accumulation and the relative indebtedness of the firm during the housing boom. The
sign of the coefficient associated to financial costs in the investment equation is negative, as
would be theoretically expected given that a higher cost of funding should be negatively cor-
related with investment dynamics. I stead, the conditional correlation between financial costs
and credit growth is positive suggesting a higher pricing (spread) of the banking sector on firms
27The differential gap of the same quantitative exercise, controlling for the log of financial costs, reaches 121pp
for investment and 62pp for credit. Instead, the incremental growth rates for investment and credit, without
additional controls are, respectively, 98pp and 53pp.
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that expand their credit to a greater extent. Nevertheless, the size of these coefficients is small,
pointing out a modest contribution of this potential confounding factors to explain the average
dynamics of investment and credit among manufacturing firms.28
The introduction of productivity shocks at firm-level aims to control for supply determinants
of firms’ marginal costs that should have an impact on investment decisions and the allocation
of credit by the banking sector. Our main results are significantly robust to the introduction
of this control, that has a minor impact on the point estimates of the relevant coefficients, as
well as in the house price elasticities of both investment and credit. In spite of the marginal
impact of thi covariate on the main estima es, it is worthy to note the sign ficant negativ
conditional correl tion between firms’ productivity with both investm nt and credit. The sign
and size of the productivity coefficients could be considered as uggestive evidence consist nt
with misallocation of cap tal among manufacturin firms.
5.4.3 Other sources of endogeneity
Our empirical strategy focuses on the potential bias created by the endogeneity of house prices,
given that these prices ca proxy for local demand shocks. In this subsection, we examine the
potential impact of other sources of endogeneity in our main results.
Endogeneity of the tangibility rate. An additional potential source of bias in the
estimates of the baseline equation 4 could emerge due to the endogeneity of the firms’ decisions
on the acquisitions of real estate assets over time. The decision to acquire these assets is not
random and this decision can bias our main estimates when the tangibility rate of firms’ assets
is related with the investment prospects of firms and their credit demand. For instance, in case
that firms anticipate that accumulating real estate assets ease their financial constraints, firms
could decide to change the composition of their assets increasing their tangibility in order to
facilitate the allocation of credit by banks and, thus, to expand their investment capacity. In
this case, firms that own a larger proportion of tangible fixed assets could be more responsive
to local demand shocks, upward biasing the estimates of coefficient β3.
In order t deal with the potential source of bias created by the endogeneity of the angibility
decision, we adap the empirical approach followed by Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) o
consid r he endogeneity created by the real state ownership decision. I the first place, we
examine the potential role of total assets value as predictor of the tangibility rate of firms in pre-
housing boom years. Table C.4 in Appendix C.2 reports estimates of a cross-sectional regression
28The results on the modest impact on financial costs on firms’ accumulation of capital are consistent with the
suggestive evidence on the reduced heterogeneity in the interest rates of new loans granted to firms reported in
Figure 3. This figure shows that the banking sector charged on average similar rates to corporate loans when the
borrower provided real estate assets as a guarantee, regardless of the geographic conditions of the municipalities
where firms were located. As discussed in previous subsections, this geographic conditions are a good predictor
of house price dynamics and, thus, this evidence suggests that local house price shocks are weakly correlated with
the pricing of corporate credit by the banking sector.
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that expand their credit to a greater extent. Nevertheless, the size of these coefficients is small,
pointing out a modest contribution of this potential confounding factors to explain the average
dynamics f invest ent and credit among manufacturing firms.28
The introduction of productivity shocks at firm-level aims to control for supply determinants
of firms’ marginal costs that should have an impact on investment decisions and the allocation
of credi by the banking s ctor. Our main results re significantly robust to the introducti n
of this control, that has a minor impact on the point estimates of the relevant coefficients, as
well as in th house price elasticities of both investment and credit. In spite f the marginal
impact of this covariate on the main estimates, it is worthy to note the significant negative
conditional correl ion between firms’ pr ductivity wit both investmen a d credit. Th sign
and size of the productivity coefficients could be considered as suggestive evidence consistent
with misallocation of capital among manufacturing firms.
5.4.3 Other sources of endogeneity
Our empirical strategy focuses on the potential bias created by the endogeneity of house prices,
given that these prices can proxy for local demand shocks. In this subsection, we examine the
potential impact of other sources of endogeneity in our main results.
Endogeneity of the tangibility rate. An additional potential source of bias in the
estimates of the baseline equation 4 could emerge due to the endogeneity of the firms’ decisions
on the acquisitions of real estate assets over time. The decision to acquire these assets is not
random and this decision can bias our main estimates when the tangibility rate of firms’ assets
is related with the investment prospects of firms and their credit demand. For instance, in case
that firms anticipate that accumulating real estate assets ease their financial constraints, firms
could decide to change the composition of their assets increasing their tangibility in order to
facilitate the allocation of credit by banks and, thus, to expand their investment capacity. In
this case, firms that own a larger proportion of tangible fixed assets could be more responsive
to local demand shocks, upward biasing the estimates of coefficient β3.
In order to deal with the potential source of bias created by the endogeneity of the tangibility
decision, we adapt the empirical approach followed by Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) to
consider the endogeneity created by the real estate ownership decision. In the first place, we
examine the potential role of total assets value as predictor of the tangibility rate of firms in pre-
housing boom years. Table C.4 in Appendix C.2 reports estimates of a cross-sectional regression
28The results on the modest impact on financial costs on firms’ accumulation of capital are consistent with the
suggestive evidence on the reduced heterogeneity in the interest rates of new loans granted to firms reported in
Figure 3. This figure shows that the banking sector charged on average similar rates to corporate loans when the
borrower provided real estate assets as a guarantee, regardless of the geographic conditions of the municipalities
where firms were located. As discussed in previous subsections, this geographic conditions are a good predictor
of house price dynamics and, thus, this evidence suggests that local house price shocks are weakly correlated with
the pricing of corporate credit by the banking sector.
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that expand their credit to a greater extent. Nevertheless, the size of these coefficients is small,
pointing out a modest contribution of this potential confounding factors to explain the average
dynamics of investment and credit among manufacturing firms.28
The introduction of productivity shocks at firm-level aims to control for supply determinants
of firms’ marginal costs that should have an impact on investment decisions and the allocation
of credit by the banking sector. Our main results are significantly robust to the introduction
of this control, that has a minor impact on the point estimates of the relevant coefficients, as
well as in the house price elasticities of both investment and credit. In spite of the marginal
impact of this covariate on the main estimates, it is worthy to note the significant negative
conditional correlation between firms’ productivity with both investment and credit. The sign
and size of the productivity coefficients could be considered as suggestive evidence consistent
with misallocation of capital among manufacturing firms.
5.4.3 Other sources of endogeneity
Our empirical strategy focuses on the potential bias created by the endogeneity of house prices,
given that these prices can proxy for local demand shocks. In this subsection, we examine the
potential impact of other sources of endogeneity in our main results.
Endogeneity of the tangibility rate. An additional potential source of bias in the
estimates of the baseline equation 4 could emerge due to the endogeneity of the firms’ decisions
on the acquisitions of real estate assets over time. The decision to acquire these assets is not
random and this decision can bias our main estimates when the tangibility rate of firms’ assets
is related with the investment prospects of firms and their credit demand. For instance, in case
that firms anticipate that accumulating real estate assets ease their financial constraints, firms
could decide to change the composition of their assets increasing their tangibility in order to
facilitate the allocation of credit by banks and, thus, to expand their investment capacity. In
this case, firms that own a larger proportion of tangible fixed assets could be more responsive
to local demand shocks, upward biasing the estimates of coefficient β3.
In order to deal with the potential source of bias created by the endogeneity of the tangibility
decision, we adapt the empirical approach followed by Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012) to
consider the endogeneity created by the real estate ownership decision. In the first place, we
examine the potential role of total assets value as predictor of the tangibility rate of firms in pre-
housing boom years. Table C.4 in Appendix C.2 reports estimates of a cross-sectional regression
28The results on the modest impact on financial costs on firms’ accumulation of capital are consistent with the
suggestive evidence on the reduced heterogeneity in the interest rates of new loans granted to firms reported in
Figure 3. This figure shows that the banking sector charged on average similar rates to corporate loans when the
borrower provided real estate assets as a guarantee, regardless of the geographic conditions of the municipalities
where firms were located. As discussed in previous subsections, this geographic conditions are a good predictor
of house price dynamics and, thus, this evidence suggests that local house price shocks are weakly correlated with
the pricing of corporate credit by the banking sector.
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of the firms’ tangibility rate in 2002 on five quintiles of the log valuation of their total assets in
2002, as well as industry-region fixed effects. Considering the fact that the estimation sample
is restricted to manufac uring firms that have information on the volume of t t l assets for t
year 2002, the estimates show that the initial level of total assets is a good predictor of the
tangibility rate of firms in the pre-housing boom period. Larger firms, when size is measured
in terms of asset value, have lower tangibility rates.
We, therefore, expand our baseline regression adding controls for initial characteristics of
the firm (quintiles of initial log assets value) interacted with the log change in house prices. This
empirical strategy aims to control for observed predictors of the tangibility decision, and it would
allow us to identify the collateral channel when these predictors also make firms more sensitive
to changes in house prices.29 Table 13 shows that our main results are robust to the inclusion
of the observed predictors of firms’ initial tangibility rate interacted with changes in local house
prices. Indeed, OLS and 2SLS estimates of the coefficients of interest are significant at the 1%
level, and the house prices elasticities of investment and credit have a similar magnitude than
the ones reported in our baseline specifications in Tables 3 and 4.
Firm size and the municipality dimension. The geographic location of large firms in
certain areas can raise concerns of reverse causality that could bias our estimates. For instance,
the economic activity and the house prices of a small municipality can be highly impacted by the
investment decisions of large firms. This fact would affect the consistency of our 2SLS estimates
when capital accumulation of these firms drives house price dynamics in these municipalities. In
order to deal with this potential source of bias, we restrict our sample to small and medium firms
(defined in terms of yearly average employment and computed as the mean of this measure for
the housing boom period) located in municipalities that overcome certain population thresholds
in the pre-boom year 2002. Tables 14 and 15 report OLS and 2SLS estimates for investment and
credit reduced-form equations for firms with less than 50 employees located in municipalities
whose population exceeds, respectively, a) 5,000 inhabitants; b) 10,000 inhabitants; and c)
50,000 inhabitants. The estimates of our main parameter of interest, β3, and the house price
elasticities are robust to these sample restrictions that aim to focus on firms that do not have
capacity to affect with their input decisions the dynamic of local house prices. The estimated
coefficients of the interaction term between the change in house prices and the tangibility rate
remain economically and statistically significant at the 1% level. The only exception is the 2SLS
estimate of the relevant coefficient in the credit equation (column 6 in Table 15) where, even
though the size of the coefficient is close to the baseline estimate, the increase in the standard
errors makes the coefficient statistically significant at the 10% level.
29This suggestive empirical approach to deal with the endogeneity of the tangibility decision is justified by the
fact, stressed in Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012), that it is hard to find instruments that predict firms’ real
estate ownership and, thus, the tangibility rate of firms. The approach thus would be incomplete in the presence
of unobserved relevant determinants of this decision that respond to changes in local house prices and that also
determine investment and credit decisions.
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of the firms’ tangibility rate in 2002 on five quintiles of the log valuation of their total assets in
2002, as well as industry-region fixed effects. Considering the fact that the estimation sample
is restricted to manufacturing firms that have information on the volume of total assets for the
year 2002, the estimates show that the initial level of total assets is a good predictor of the
tangibility rate of firms in the pre-housing boom period. Larger firms, when size is measured
in terms of asset value, have lower tangibility rates.
We, therefore, expand our baseline regression adding controls for initial characteristics of
the firm (quintiles of initial log assets value) interacted with the log change in house prices. This
empirical strategy aims to control for observed predictors of the tangibility decision, and it would
allow us to identify the collateral channel when these predictors also make firms more sensitive
to changes in house prices.29 Table 13 shows that our main results are robust to the inclusion
of the observed predictors of firms’ initial tangibility rate interacted with changes in local house
prices. Indeed, OLS and 2SLS estimates of the coefficients of interest are significant at the 1%
level, and the house prices elasticities of investment and credit have a similar magnitude than
the ones reported in our baseline specifications in Tables 3 and 4.
Firm size and the municipality dimension. The geographic location of large firms in
certain areas can raise concerns of reverse causality that could bias our estimates. For instance,
the economic activity and the house prices of a small municipality can be highly impacted by the
investment decisions of large firms. This fact would affect the consistency of our 2SLS estimates
when capital accumulation of these firms drives house price dynamics in these municipalities. In
order to deal with this potential source of bias, we restrict our sample to small and medium firms
(defined in terms of yearly average employment and computed as the mean of this measure for
the housing boom period) located in municipalities that overcome certain population thresholds
in the pre-boom year 2002. Tables 14 and 15 report OLS and 2SLS estimates for investment and
credit reduced-form equations for firms with less than 50 employees located in municipalities
whose population exceeds, respectively, a) 5,000 inhabitants; b) 10,000 inhabitants; and c)
50,000 inhabitants. The estimates of our main parameter of interest, β3, and the house price
elasticities are robust to these sample restrictions that aim to focus on firms that do not have
capacity to affect with their input decisions the dynamic of local house prices. The estimated
coefficients of the interaction term between the change in house prices and the tangibility rate
remain economically and statistically significant at the 1% level. The only exception is the 2SLS
estimate of the relevant coefficient in the credit equation (column 6 in Table 15) where, even
though the size of the coefficient is close to the baseline estimate, the increase in the standard
errors makes the coefficient statistically significant at the 10% level.
29This suggestive empirical approach to deal with the endogeneity of the tangibility decision is justified by the
fact, stressed in Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012), that it is hard to find instruments that predict firms’ real
estate ownership and, thus, the tangibility rate of firms. The approach thus would be incomplete in the presence
of unobserved relevant determinants of this decision that respond to changes in local house prices and that also
determine investment and credit decisions.
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5.4.4 Additional robustness tests
Finally, we undertake several further robustness tests of our main estimates that are reported
in Appendix C.2. These robustness consider an alternative definition of the investment rate,
different estimation samples and the clustering of the standard errors at different levels.
Investment and the capital-labor ratio. In our baseline specification we have defined
the investment rate as the log difference of the capital stock. As a robustness, we estimate
equation 4 considering now the log change in the capital-labor ratio as the dependent variable.
The variance of this ratio is the main driver of the industry-level TFP and, thus, the estimates of
this specification can be considered as a further evidence on the impact of the collateral channel
on capital misallocation. The estimates reported in Table C.5 are qualitatively similar to those in
Table 3. In particular, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model, the coefficient of
the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at 1% in all specifications. Using the
2SLS estimates to compute the house price elasticity for the capital-labor ratio, the dispersion of
this measure, as a function of the tangibility rate, is similar to the elasticity of the capital stock.
For instance, given the same local house price shock, the capital-labor ratio would increase in
92pp for firms moving from the bottom 25th percentile of the distribution of tangible fixed assets
to the 75th percentile of this distribution. This evidence points out an increasing dispersion of
the capital-labor ratio associated to local house price shocks.
Domestic companies. In order to mitigate the potential biases created by the composition
of the sample, we exclude from our sample of manufacturing firms the subsidiaries of foreign
multinationals operating in Spain. This can be justified because the investment and credit
decisions of these firms could react differently than domestic companies to specific local demand
shocks and, also, because the decisions of the subsidiaries could be related with the unobserved
collateral value of the multinational group. The results in Table C.6 show that OLS and 2SLS
estimates on the impact of house prices on both investment and credit are not significantly
affected by the exclusion of these firms that just represent 5% of the estimation sample.
Clustering. In Table C.7, we analyze how our main results on investment and credit from
Tables 3 and 4 are affected by clustering of the standard errors at different levels. In this
table, we depart from our baseline level of clustering (municipality) and we show our baseline
OLS and 2SLS estimates for investment and credit for our preferred specification with province
clustering, two-way clustering by province and sector, and two-way clustering by municipality
and sector. Focusing on the coefficient of the interaction term related with the main prediction
of the model, the standard errors are somewhat larger when we use province clustering, and
very similar or smaller when we use two-way clustering by province and sector and two-way
clustering by municipality and sector. In all cases, the coefficient of interest remains statistically
significant at 1% level.
Non-financial market economy. Throughout this article, the analysis has been restricted
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of the firms’ tangibility rate in 2002 on five quintiles of the log valuation of their total assets in
2002, as well as industry-region fixed effects. Considering the fact that the estimation sample
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year 2002, the estimates show that the initial level of total assets is a good predictor of the
tangibility rate of firms in the pre-housing boom period. Lar er firms, whe size is measured
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the firm (quintiles of initial log assets value) interacted with the log change in house prices. This
empirical strategy aims to control for observed predictors of the tangibility decision, and it would
allow us to identify the collateral channel when these predictors also make firms more sensitive
to changes in house prices.29 Table 13 shows that our main results are robust to the inclusion
of the observed predictors of firms’ initial tangibility rate interacted with changes in local house
prices. Indeed, OLS and 2SLS estimates of the coefficients of interest are significant at the 1%
level, and the house prices elasticities of investment and credit have a similar magnitude than
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(defined in terms of yearly average employment and computed as the mean of this measure for
the housing boom period) located in municipalities that overcome certain population thresholds
in the pre-boom year 2002. Tables 14 and 15 report OLS and 2SLS estimates for investment and
credit reduced-form equations for fi ms with less than 50 employees located in munici alities
whose population exceeds, respectively, a) 5,000 inhabitants; b) 10,000 inhabitants; and c)
50,000 inhabitants. The estimates of our main parameter of interest, β3, and the house price
elasticities are robust to these sample restrictions that aim to focus on firms that do not have
capacity to affect with their input decisions the dynamic of local house prices. The estimated
coefficients of the interaction term between the change in house prices and the tangibility rate
remain economically and statistically significant at the 1% level. The only exception is the 2SLS
estimate of the relevant coefficient in the credit equation (column 6 in Table 15) where, even
though the size of the coefficient is close to the baseline estimate, the increase in the standard
errors makes the coefficient statistically significant at the 10% level.
29This suggestive e pirical approach to deal with the endogeneity of the ta gibility decision is justified by th
fact, stressed in Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012), that it is hard to find instruments that predict firms’ real
estate ownership and, thus, the tangibility rate of firms. The approach thus would be incomplete in the presence
of unobserved relevant determinants of this decision that respond to changes in local house prices and that also
determine investment and credit decisions.
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5.4.4 Additional robustness tests
Finally, we undertake several further robustness tests of our main estimates that are reported
in Appendix C.2. These robustness consider an alternative definition of the investment rate,
different estimation samples and the clustering of the standard errors at different levels.
Investment and the capital-labor ratio. In our baseline specification we have defined
the investment rate as the log difference of the capital stock. As a robustness, we estimate
equation 4 considering now the log change in the capital-labor ratio as the dependent variable.
The variance of this ratio is the main driver of the industry-level TFP and, thus, the estimates of
this specification can be considered as a further evidence on the impact of the collateral channel
on capital misallocation. The estimates reported in Table C.5 are qualitatively similar to those in
Table 3. In particular, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model, the coefficient of
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2SLS estimates to compute the house price elasticity for the capital-labor ratio, the dispersion of
this measure, as a function of the tangibility rate, is similar to the elasticity of the capital stock.
For instance, given the same local house price shock, the capital-labor ratio would increase in
92pp for firms moving from the bottom 25th percentile of the distribution of tangible fixed assets
to the 75th percentile of this distribution. This evidence points out an increasing dispersion of
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Domestic companies. In order to mitigate the potential biases created by the composition
of the sample, we exclude from our sample of manufacturing firms the subsidiaries of foreign
multinationals operating in Spain. This can be justified because the investment and credit
decisions of these firms could react differently than domestic companies to specific local demand
shocks and, also, because the decisions of the subsidiaries could be related with the unobserved
collateral value of the multinational group. The results in Table C.6 show that OLS and 2SLS
estimates on the impact of house prices on both investment and credit are not significantly
affected by the exclusion of these firms that just represent 5% of the estimation sample.
Clustering. In Table C.7, we analyze how our main results on investment and credit from
Tables 3 and 4 are affected by clustering of the standard errors at different levels. In this
table, we depart from our baseline level of clustering (municipality) and we show our baseline
OLS and 2SLS estimates for investment and credit for our preferred specification with province
clustering, two-way clustering by province and sector, and two-way clustering by municipality
and sector. Focusing on the coefficient of the interaction term related with the main prediction
of the model, the standard errors are somewhat larger when we use province clustering, and
very similar or smaller when we use two-way clustering by province and sector and two-way
clustering by municipality and sector. In all cases, the coefficient of interest remains statistically
significant at 1% level.
Non-financial market economy. Throughout this article, the analysis has been restricted
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to manufacturing firms due to the technical limitations identified in the literature that are asso-
ciated with the difficulties to estimate production functions for industries other than manufac-
turing and, thus, the measurement of capital misallocation in these industries. For completeness,
we include as a robustness the main estimates of the paper considering in the estimation sample
firms that are active in the non-financial market economy. This sample includes all sectors
of activity excluding the ones related with the activity of the public sector, mining industries
and the financial sector. We also exclude from the sample firms in the construction and the
real-estate sector. The results on the main estimates of the reduced-form equations of invest-
ment and credit (Tables C.8 to C.9) are qualitatively robust when including these industries,
suggesting that our main finding on the impact of the collateral channel as a mechanism that
creates capital misallocation could apply to the whole non-market economy.
6 Aggregate Effects
In this section, we provide suggestive evidence on the aggregate effects of local house price
booms on the misallocation of capital within manufacturing industries using the suitable case
of the Spanish housing boom. We use this evidence to provide a back of the envelope calculation
on the contribution of the collateral channel on investment, identified in the previous section,
to explain the fall of aggregate manufacturing TFP in Spain between 2003 and 2007.
In section 5, estimates from reduced-form regressions show the significant impact of local
house price shocks on capital and credit allocation across manufacturing firms. Indeed, firms
that received larger local shocks to the valuation of their real estate assets experienced a greater
accumulation of capital. These results point out to capital misallocation across firms through
this collateral channel as illustrated, for instance, in Table C.5 that informs us on the causal
positive relationship between the size of local house price booms and the dispersion of the
capital-labor ratio among firms within manufacturing industries. In this section, we focus on
the aggregate effects on productivity of this source of capital misallocation testing the empirical
predictions 3 and 4 as stated in theoretical section 3. These predictions indicate that capital
allocation within industries is less efficient in the presence of local house price shocks such as
the ones created by a housing boom. The differential house price paths across municipalities,
where the real estate assets of firms are located, cause an increase in the variance of the log
capital-labor ratio within industries revealing capital misallocation. The model predicts that
this measure of misallocation, the variance in the capital-labor ratio in an industry, is a sufficient
statistic on TFP, which implies that an increase of capital dispersion translates into a decline
of aggregate productivity. These theoretical predictions on the relationship between capital
dispersion and productivity are consistent with misallocation models à la Hsieh and Klenow
(2009). At the same time, the collateral channel affects the allocation of capital in the geo-
graphical space. Municipalities that experience a higher house price appreciation accumulate
more capital because of the larger increase in the valuation of collateralizable real estate assets
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owned by firms located in those municipalities. This spatial channel of capital misallocation is
in line with the geographic dimension of misallocation in Hsieh and Moretti (2019), that showed
the significant impact of local restrictions to housing supply to create spatial misallocation of
labor across metropolitan areas in the United States.
In order to test these predictions, we first divide the sample of manufacturing firms in
municipality-industry pairs for each year included in the panel 2003-2007. For each pair, we
compute the variance in the log capital-labor ratio in real terms. We then run the following
baseline regression,
logV ar(K/L)mst = β0 + β1logHPmt + δsrt + ϵmst, (6)
where V ar(K/L)mst is the variance in the log capital-labor ratio in real terms in municipality
m, industry s and year t, HPmt is the average house price index in real terms in municipality
m at year t, and δsrt is a set of industry s, region r and year t fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. The model predicts β1 > 0.
Table 16 reports the coefficient estimates of running equation 6 including different sets of
fixed effects. In column 1 we consider year fixed effects to capture aggregate macro conditions
that commonly affect municipality-industries pairs. In column 2 we include industry-year fixed
effects, which allow us to control for industry-specific shocks that affect industries regardless of
their geographic location. In column 3 we add industry-region-year fixed effects, in order to also
consider common shocks within industries that can be location (region) specific. The sign of
the house price coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all columns. The magnitude
of the coefficient ranges from 0.39 to 0.53 depending on the set of fixed effects included in the
specification. A one percent increase in house prices at municipality level is thus associated
with an increase in the dispersion of the capital-labor ratio of manufacturing-industries at
municipality level of about 0.4-0.5 percent. The specification that includes industry-region-year
fixed effects is our preferred one to examine the relation between local housing booms and capital
misallocation within manufacturing industries. Indeed, these estimates show the existence of a
positive correlation between local house price booms and the dispersion across the geographical
space of the log capital-labor ratio within manufacturing industries. This suggestive evidence is
consistent with the view that the average dispersion of capital in a given manufacturing industry
increased more in municipalities that experienced a larger increase in house prices, revealing
misallocation of resources.30
Considering these reduced-form estimates, we undertake a simple back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation of the impact of the housing boom on aggregate productivity, through the effect of
30As a robustness, Table C.10 in appendix C reports the same estimates for the sample of firms in the non-
financial market economy that includes industries non-included in the manufacturing sector. The magnitude of
the coefficient estimates is very similar, ranging from 0.34 to 0.50, suggesting that the misallocation of capital
across the space also increased within industries beyond the ones in the manufacturing sector.
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these prices on the dispersion of capital within industries. In order to simplify the analysis, we
assume a counterfactual economy where local house prices grow according to their fundamen-
al level. In this econom , consiste t with our theoretical framework, we consider that loc
housing booms emerge when in a given municipality housing demand increases above its fun-
damental level. The effect of this increase in demand on local house prices depends on local
geographical conditions. In particular, the size of the local house price shock is inversely related
with the housing supply elasticity of the municipality, which depends on its initial geograph-
ical constraints. At empirical level, an important challenge to compute the aggregate effect
of heterogeneous local housing booms is the difficulty to measure the actual size of the house
price shock in the economy. To mitigate this limitation, we follow Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz
(2008) and Mian and Sufi (2011) that examine the heterogeneous nature of local house booms
classifying municipalities in quartiles according to the distribution of initial housing supply con-
straints. In our setting, we make the conservative assumption that the average size of the house
price shock in the economy can be proxied by the differential average growth rate in the average
price of houses located in the first and the fourth quartile of the pre-boom buildable urban land
ratio distribution of municipalities in Spain. Indeed, when there is a ousing boom the path of
house prices located in municipalities in the first quartile should be closer to its fundamental
level, m anwhile pri es should grow more in land-co strained areas. Thus, we assume that the
differential on average house prices of these two groups is the proxy of the aggregate average
effect of the housing boom on house prices.
According to the data, the differential growth in average house prices among the first and
the fourth quartile between 2003 and 2007 was of 9% in real terms. Using the coefficients
reported in columns 1 to 3 in Table 16, that measure the increase of the capital-labor ratio
variance associated to 1% increase in log house prices, we compute the increase of this variance
due to the housing boom. In particular, the coefficients in Table 16 imply that the housing
boom can explain an increase in the variance of the capital-labor ratio that ranges from 3.5%
to 4.8%, being the latter the increase inferred from our preferred specification (column 3).
The actual increase in the variance of the log capital-labor ratio with manufacturing industries
in Spain between 2003 and 2007 was 9.8%. Therefore, the housing boom could account for
between 35% and 50% of the increase in the dispersion of capital among Spanish manufacturing
industries during this period. Given the one-to-one mapping between changes in the variance of
log capital-labor ratio and TFP changes, this back-of-the-envelope computation indicates that
the differential local house price growth (created by the housing boom) can account for between
one-third and half of the total decline in aggregate productivity in the Spanish manufacturing
sector during the housing boom.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provided empirical evidence on the contribution of local house price booms to
create capital misallocation within manufacturing industries. Spain experienced a salient hous-
ing boom in the late 2000s that coincided in time with an outstanding expansion of corporate
non-financial investment and banking credit in the manufacturing sector. Empirical evidence
indicates that during the peak of this housing boom (2003-2007), Spanish manufacturing firms
that had a larger proportion of tangible fixed assets able to be collateralized obtained more credit
from the banking system and their investment grew more intensively. Using geographical vari-
ation at municipality level on house prices and urban land supply, we show that this collateral
channel on investment and credit was exacerbated when firms were located in land-constrained
geographical areas, which experienced a larger house price appreciation.
This paper points out the geographical conditions that shape real estate markets as a poten-
tial source that creates industry misallocation of resources through the heterogeneous impact
of local house prices on the collateral value of manufacturing firms. Indeed, we document an
increasing dispersion of the capital-labor ratio within manufacturing industries over the Spanish
housing boom due to the differential local shocks to housing prices that affected the relative
valuation of assets owned by firms in a heterogeneous way. Our empirical findings are consistent
with the collateral channel on corporate investment created by real estate shocks documented
for the United States by Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012). The novelty of the paper relies on
linking this channel with geographical conditions on local housing markets where collateralizable
real estate assets locate as a source of capital misallocation within industries. This geographical
dimension of misallocation could be a channel that contributes to create aggregate TFP losses
during housing booms. Using our reduced-form estimates, we undertake a simple counterfactual
calculation showing that during the Spanish housing boom the misallocation generated by the
collateral channel in different local real estate markets could account for between one-third and
half of the fall in TFP experienced in the Spanish manufacturing sector.
The results on the relationship between house prices and capital misallocation do not depend
on the nature or mechanism that originates the housing boom. However, one potential interpre-
tation of our results is that we would have identified one micro-mechanism through which capital
inflows are able to create aggregate capital misallocation within industries when these inflows
are associated to local housing booms. In this sense, we would provide a micro-mechanism to
the aggregate misallocation generated by capital inflows documented in Gopinath et al. (2017)
for Spain during the late 2000s. Finally, in a context of secular stagnation with downward pres-
sure to global interest rates, it may be interesting to explore the interdependencies between the
collateral channel created by housing booms and the potential exacerbation that low interest
rates create. Declining global interest rates may be conducive to housing booms (search for
yield) and, in addition, the reduction in borrowing cost may be biased towards collateralized
loans. In principle, both effects should be conducive to create misallocation but we leave a
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quantitative analysis of this question for future research.
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Note: Panel (a) plots the seasonally adjusted Case-Shiller home price index in nominal terms for Spain and the U.S.
from 2000 to 2012, using 2000 as base year. Data for Spain come from the Spanish Ownership Registry, and data
for the U.S. come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Panel (b) plots gross fixed capital formation, using
2000 a as base year, excluding investment in dwellings and other buildings and structures (roads, bridges, airfields or
dams) in order to proxy non-residential investment by the private sector. Data come from the OECD database on
Investment by asset. Panel (c) plots the aggregate leverage ratio of non-financial corporations defined as the ratio
of debt (banking credit and corporate bonds) as a share of GDP, using 2000 as the base year. Data come from the
Eurosystem. Panel (d) plots the collateralized granted credit to non-financial corporations as a share of total granted
credit and as a share of GDP. Data come from the Bank of Spain.
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Note: Figure plots the yearly weighted averages of the variance of the log real capital-labor ratio for
firms in the non-financial market economy from 2000 to 2012. The averages are reported for both
elastic and inelastic municipalities, as well as for the mean of Spanish municipalities with population
over 1000 inhabitants. Elastic (inelastic) municipalities are those being above the 75th (below the
25th) percentile in the municipalities’ distribution of the ratio of buildable urban land in Spain in
1997. The averages are obtained weighting the variance of the log real capital-labor ratio of each
firm by the firm production’s share in the aggregate production of firms located in either elastic or
inelastic municipalities. The mean for Spain weights firms’ variance of the log real capital-labor ratio
by the firms’ share in the aggregate production of Spanish municipalities with population over 1000
inhabitants. Data come from the Bank of Spain and the Spanish Cadastre.
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Note: Figure plots the monthly average initial nominal interest rate of loans with maturity higher
than 1 year granted to firms by the banking sector when the borrowers provides real estate assets
as a guarantee of the loan. The averages are reported for firms located in either elastic or inelastic
municipalities. Elastic (inelastic) municipalities are those being above the 75th (below the 25th)
percentile in the municipalities’ distribution of the ratio of buildable urban land in Spain in 1997.
Data come from the Ownership Registry of Spain and the Spanish Cadastre.
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Note: Figure plots the yearly weighted averages of the variance of the log real capital-labor ratio for
firms in the non-financial market economy from 2000 to 2012. The averages are reported for both
elastic and inelastic municipalities, as well as for the mean of Spanish municipalities with population
over 1000 inhabitants. Elastic (inelastic) municipalities are those being above the 75th (below the
25th) percentile in the municipalities’ distribution of the ratio of buildable urban land in Spain in
1997. The averages are obtained weighting the variance of the log real capital-labor ratio of each
firm by the firm production’s share in the aggregate production of firms located in either elastic or
inelastic municipalities. The mean for Spain weights firms’ variance of the log real capital-labor ratio
by the firms’ share in the aggregate production of Spanish municipalities with population over 1000
inhabitants. Data come from the Bank of Spain and the Spanish Cadastre.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD 25th Median 75th Observations
Panel A. Firm Dataset
Share of Tangible Fixed Assets 28.03 21.10 10.59 23.35 41.60 255,855
Capital-Labor Ratio 1.62 2.51 0.38 0.89 1.91 255,763
Leverage Ratio 0.64 0.30 0.42 0.66 0.85 241,608
Employment 16.85 24.81 4 9 19 239,976
Financial Costs 4.23 6.78 1.07 2.62 4.89 243,213
Yearly Investment Rate 0.09 0.60 -0.16 0.00 0.10 255,855
Yearly Credit Growth 0.16 0.70 -0.18 -0.03 0.25 207,506
Cumulative Investment Rate 0.79 5.26 -0.32 -0.03 0.62 36,950
Cumulative Credit Growth 1.16 7.09 -0.25 -0.18 0.99 31,245
Panel B. Municipality Dataset
Yearly House Prices Growth 0.14 0.33 0 0.10 0.22 7,824
Cumulative House Prices Growth 0.55 0.58 0.27 0.48 0.71 1,567
Buildable Urban Land Ratio 0.75 1.11 0.31 0.55 0.88 2,309
Note: Panel A presents summary statistics for the sample of manufacturing firms that are located in municipalities
for which data on house prices and the pre-boom ratio of buildable urban land are available. This panel first reports
summary statistics of the annual data of the firms in the period 2003-2007 on i) the share of tangible fixed assets,
calculated as the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate assets, factories and equipment) over
the book value of total assets; ii) the capital-labor ratio, measured as the ratio of the book value of fixed assets over
the wage bill; iii) the leverage ratio, computed as the ratio of total outstanding debt to the book value of total assets;
iv) the average number of employees (full-time equivalent); and v) financial costs, computed as the proportion of
financial expenditures to total outstanding debt. The panel then presents summary statistics of firms on the yearly
investment rate and the yearly credit growth, that refers to the annual growth rate of, respectively, the real book
value of fixed assets and the credit exposure with the banking system over the period 2003 and 2007. The panel also
presents the cumulative growth rate of credit and investment rate from 2003 to 2007 for those firms included in the
sample during those specific years. Panel B presents summary statistics for those municipalities whose population
exceeds 1,000 inhabitants and that have manufacturing firms included in the sample. Yearly house price growth refers
to the annual growth rate of the municipal house price indices in real terms over the period 2003 and 2007. Cumulative
house price growth denotes the growth rate of municipal house price indices in real terms from 2003 to 2007 for those
municipalities that have manufacturing firms in the sample during those specific years. Buildable urban land ratio
refers to the ratio of available buildable urban land to urban land with already built structures in 1997.
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Table 2: Buildable Urban Land and House Prices
Dependent variable: ∆ Ln(House Prices)
(1) 1995 (2) 1996 (3) 1997 (4) 1998
Buildable Urban Land Ratio × -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.031***
∆ Real Interest Rate of Mortgages (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Statistic 11.94 9.79 11.54 15.73
Municipalities 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854
Observations 6,594 6,594 6,594 6,594
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes
municipalities where i) manufacturing firms are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; and ii)
there are available both residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites.
Dependent variable is the municipality’s yearly house prices growth that is measured by the log difference of
the average price index in real terms of residential housing prices between years t− 1 and t in municipality
m. The buildable urban land ratio is the proxy of the pre-boom housing supply elasticity in a municipality
m, and it is built in Basco, Lopez-Rodriguez and Elias (2021). The change in the real interest rate of
mortgages is computed using the average yearly rate of the flow of mortgage loans granted to households
for the purchase of a house with an initial mortgage term of more than 10 years, provided by the Bank of
Spain from 2003 to 2007. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 3: House Prices and Investment
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.657*** -0.737*** -0.760**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.219) (0.232) (0.297)
Tangibility 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.929*** 0.659*** 0.634*** 0.631***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.131*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 2.878*** 3.143*** 3.181***
Tangibility (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.412) (0.438) (0.439)
Observations 186,650 186,650 186,602 186,650 186,650 186,602
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Industry-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 16.46 16.14 10.48
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 45.93 45.60 47.33
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes manufacturing firms
that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price
indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in the years
included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t− 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007.
Dependent variable is the firm’s yearly investment rate that is measured by the log difference of the stock of capital between
years t − 1 and t measured in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in
municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories
and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns
1 to 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates.
F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors.
F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm∗∆Rt
equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient
on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 4: House Prices and Banking Credit
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Credit)
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.040** -0.039** -0.045** -0.111 -0.135 -0.185
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.372) (0.386) (0.459)
Tangibility 0.246*** 0.245*** 0.248*** 0.090* 0.081 0.094*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.116** 0.116** 0.123*** 1.751*** 1.826*** 1.711***
Tangibility (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.445) (0.462) (0.460)
Observations 158,522 158,522 158,477 158,522 158,522 158,477
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Industry-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 13.82 13.63 9.06
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 42.04 42.12 43.66
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes manufacturing
firms that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential
house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have outstanding debt with
the banking sector. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period 2003-
2007. Dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit
with the banking system in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing
in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate,
factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance
sheet. Columns 1 to 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple
endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage
coefficient on HSEm ∗∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis
that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 5: House Prices and Extensive Margin of Credit
Dependent variable: Acceptance of a New Loan Application
Acceptance Dummy Number of Loans Proportion of Loans
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) OLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.018 -0.218 -0.011 -0.129 -0.008 -0.149
(0.012) (0.268) (0.016) (0.373) (0.005) (0.104)
Tangibility 0.044*** 0.026 0.044** -0.023 0.026*** 0.009
(0.015) (0.027) (0.021) (0.039) (0.007) (0.011)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.064** 0.241 0.065 0.750** 0.031** 0.201**
Tangibility (0.032) (0.223) (0.041) (0.345) (0.013) (0.091)
Observations 186,602 186,602 186,602 186,602 186,602 186,602
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 10.48 10.48 10.48
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 47.33 47.33 47.33
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes manufacturing
firms that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential
house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of
capital in the years included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year
t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is a dummy that takes value 1 for firm i when at
least one new loan application is accepted by a bank. Dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the number of new loan
applications of firm i that are accepted by banks. Dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is the proportion of new loans
over the total number of loans granted by banks to firm i. House prices denote the average price index in real terms
of residential housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical
property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported
in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 2, 4 and 6
report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification
tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the
null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance
levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 6: House Prices and Investment - Firm Size Controls
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) OLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.041** -0.719** -0.044*** -0.759** -0.041*** -0.705**
(0.016) (0.307) (0.016) (0.299) (0.015) (0.287)
Tangibility 0.934*** 0.632*** 0.956*** 0.654*** 1.064*** 0.773***
(0.026) (0.047) (0.025) (0.046) (0.024) (0.046)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.128*** 3.217*** 0.133*** 3.224*** 0.128*** 3.102***







Observations 175,258 175,258 185,910 185,910 186,452 186,452
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 11.19 10.33 10.33
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 45.69 47.39 47.41
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The baseline specification for the investment equation
includes as additional controls firm-specific yearly measures of the log firm size during the housing boom. The log firm size
is computed using three alternative measures: the average employment (columns 1 and 2), total sales in real terms (columns
3 and 4) and total assets in real terms (columns 5 and 6). The estimation sample includes manufacturing firms that i)
are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price
indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in the years
included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period 2003-
2007.Dependent variable is the firm’s yearly investment rate that is measured by the log difference of the stock of capital
between years t − 1 and t measured in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential
housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate,
factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet.
Columns 1, 3 and 5 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 2, 4 and 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple
endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage
coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis
that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 7: House Prices and Credit - Firm Size Controls
Dependent variable: Credit
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) OLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.042** -0.152 -0.045** -0.191 -0.043** -0.134
(0.019) (0.488) (0.018) (0.448) (0.018) (0.454)
Tangibility 0.256*** 0.090 0.298*** 0.138** 0.356*** 0.213***
(0.031) (0.059) (0.029) (0.056) (0.027) (0.055)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.118** 1.837*** 0.126*** 1.780*** 0.119*** 1.599***







Observations 149,005 149,005 158,157 158,157 158,432 158,432
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 9.62 8.96 8.99
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 42.26 43.64 43.79
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The baseline specification for the investment
equation includes as additional controls firm-specific yearly measures of the log firm size during the housing boom. The log
firm size is computed using three alternative measures: the average employment (columns 1 and 2), total sales in real terms
(columns 3 and 4) and total assets in real terms (columns 5 and 6). The estimation sample includes manufacturing firms
that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house
price indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in the
years included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period
2003-2007. Dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding
credit with the banking system in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential
housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real
estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance
sheet. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 2, 4 and 6 report Two-Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of
multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that
the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the
null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗ ∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 8: House Prices and Investment - Weighted Least Squares
Dependent variable: Investment
Weighting variable: Ln(Av.Employment) Ln(Av.Sales) Ln(Av.Assets)
(1) WLS (2) 2SLS (3) WLS (4) 2SLS (5) WLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.044*** -0.837*** -0.046*** -0.750** -0.046*** -0.766***
(0.016) (0.295) (0.016) (0.297) (0.015) (0.295)
Tangibility 0.905*** 0.583*** 0.928*** 0.629*** 0.920*** 0.619***
(0.028) (0.050) (0.025) (0.045) (0.025) (0.045)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.139*** 3.450*** 0.138*** 3.204*** 0.137*** 3.228***
Tangibility (0.040) (0.496) (0.038) (0.445) (0.038) (0.445)
Observations 175,158 175,158 186,380 186,380 186,596 186,596
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 9.97 10.05 10.21
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 37.37 45.34 45.42
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes manufacturing firms
that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price
indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in the years
included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t− 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007.
Dependent variable is the firm’s yearly investment rate that is measured by the log difference of the stock of capital between
years t − 1 and t measured in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in
municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories
and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. We use
weighted least squares to estimate the regression parameters and weight firms according to three firm size measures computed
as means over the housing boom period (2003-2007): i) the log average employment; ii) the log mean of real sales; and ii) the
log mean of assets in real terms. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimates, and columns 2, 4 and 6
report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates using the same weights. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW)
weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test
statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the
corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗ ∆Rt) equals zero.
Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 9: House Prices and Credit - Weighted Least Squares
Dependent variable: Credit
Weighting variable: Ln(Av.Employment) Ln(Av.Sales) Ln(Av.Assets)
(1) WLS (2) 2SLS (3) WLS (4) 2SLS (5) WLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.039* -0.366 -0.044** -0.181 -0.045** -0.198
(0.021) (0.550) (0.019) (0.479) (0.019) (0.474)
Tangibility 0.235*** 0.033 0.245*** 0.089 0.248*** 0.088
(0.033) (0.064) (0.029) (0.056) (0.029) (0.057)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.109** 2.198*** 0.122** 1.742*** 0.120** 1.771***
Tangibility (0.053) (0.542) (0.048) (0.465) (0.048) (0.469)
Observations 149,841 149,841 158,365 158,365 158,475 158,475
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 8.45 8.62 8.81
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 33.99 41.50 41.63
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes manufacturing
firms that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential
house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital
in the years included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t−1 and year t for the period
2003-2007. Dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit
with the banking system in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in
municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories
and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. We
use weighted least squares to estimate the regression parameters and weight firms according to three firm size measures
computed as means over the housing boom period (2003-2007): i) the log average employment; ii) the log mean of real
sales; and ii) the log mean of assets in real terms. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimates,
and columns 2, 4 and 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates using the same weights. F-statitics denote the
Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on
IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗∆Rt equals
zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on
Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 10: Credit and Banks
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Credit)
Commercial Banks Savings Banks
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.046** -0.138 -0.077** -0.741
(0.022) (0.533) (0.038) (0.747)
Tangibility 0.187*** 0.025 0.399*** 0.228**
(0.033) (0.064) (0.055) (0.097)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.109* 1.816*** 0.197** 1.893**
Tangibility (0.059) (0.559) (0.083) (0.816)
Observations 108,287 108,287 43,650 43,650
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 6.29 5.33
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 30.17 24.74
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Firms are classified
depending on the type of bank that is their main provider of credit (Commercial or Savings
Banks). The estimation sample includes manufacturing firms that i) are active in at least one
year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house
price indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have
outstanding debt with the banking sector. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X
between year t − 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the yearly
growth rate of firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit with the
banking system in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of
residential housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the
book value on physical property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over
the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1
and 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 2 and 4 report Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW)
weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1
denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient
on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for
the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗ ∆Rt) equals zero.
Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 11: House Prices and Investment - Additional Confounding Factors
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) OLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.046*** -1.041*** -0.044** -0.977*** -0.046*** -0.740**
(0.017) (0.308) (0.018) (0.314) (0.016) (0.301)
Tangibility 0.958*** 0.571*** 0.979*** 0.600*** 0.904*** 0.608***
(0.027) (0.057) (0.029) (0.059) (0.024) (0.045)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.135*** 4.025*** 0.123*** 3.907*** 0.136*** 3.174***
Tangibility (0.041) (0.571) (0.043) (0.582) (0.038) (0.438)
Ln(Leverage Ratio) 0.032*** 0.040***
(0.003) (0.003)




Observations 174,022 174,022 162,100 162,100 186,357 186,357
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 9.86 9.70 10.31
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 40.95 36.88 47.26
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The baseline specification for the investment equation
adds, separately, three additional firm-specific yearly covariates: i) the log leverage ratio, measured as the ratio of total outstanding
debt over the book value of assets (columns 1 and 2); ii) the log financial costs, computed as the ratio of financial expenditures over
total outstanding debt (columns 3 and 4); and iii) the log productivity of the firm, measured as the TFP-sales estimated adopting
the procedure proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (columns 5 and 6). The estimation sample includes manufacturing
firms that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential
house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in
the years included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period
2003-2007.Dependent variable is the firm’s yearly investment rate that is measured by the log difference of the stock of capital
between years t− 1 and t measured in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing
in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories
and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1, 3
and 5 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 2, 4 and 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates.
F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors.
F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗∆Rt
equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on
Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 12: House Prices and Credit - Additional Confounding Factors
Dependent variable: Credit
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) OLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.059*** -0.682* -0.055*** -0.422 -0.044** -0.173
(0.018) (0.411) (0.019) (0.402) (0.018) (0.457)
Tangibility 0.239*** -0.001 0.233*** 0.047 0.237*** 0.083
(0.030) (0.063) (0.031) (0.063) (0.029) (0.056)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.155*** 2.592*** 0.134*** 2.002*** 0.123*** 1.718***
Tangibility (0.046) (0.530) (0.046) (0.525) (0.047) (0.462)
Ln (Leverage Ratio) 0.056*** 0.062***
(0.005) (0.005)




Observations 149,197 149,197 143,614 143,614 158,307 158,307
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 9.18 8.85 9.03
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 40.84 37.71 43.57
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The baseline specification for the credit equation
adds, separately, three additional firm-specific yearly covariates: i) the log leverage ratio, measured as the ratio of total
outstanding debt over the book value of assets (columns 1 and 2); ii) the log financial costs, computed as the ratio of financial
expenditures over total outstanding debt (columns 3 and 4); and iii) the log productivity of the firm, measured as the TFP-sales
estimated adopting the procedure proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (columns 5 and 6). The estimation sample includes
manufacturing firms that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both
residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of
capital in the years included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t− 1 and year t for the
period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding
credit with the banking system in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing
in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories
and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns
1, 3 and 5 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 2, 4 and 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous
regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on
HSEm ∗∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage
coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 13: Endogeneity of Tangibility Rate
Dependent variable: Investment ∆Ln(Credit)
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.029 -0.587 -0.021 0.568
(0.024) (0.393) (0.032) (0.590)
Tangibility 0.941*** 0.616*** 0.261*** 0.104*
(0.028) (0.047) (0.032) (0.060)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.133*** 3.511*** 0.130** 1.822***
Tangibility (0.039) (0.482) (0.053) (0.501)
2nd Quantile Ln(Assets 2002) × -0.014 -0.377* -0.020 -0.659**
∆ Ln(House Prices) (0.026) (0.227) (0.039) (0.318)
3rd Quantile Ln(Assets 2002) × 0.008 -0.582*** -0.035 -0.930***
∆ Ln(House Prices) (0.025) (0.222) (0.036) (0.304)
4th Quantile Ln(Assets 2002) × -0.020 -0.578*** -0.029 -1.132***
∆ Ln(House Prices) (0.024) (0.215) (0.038) (0.342)
5th Quantile Ln(Assets 2002) × -0.031 -0.743*** -0.032 -1.340***
∆ Ln(House Prices) (0.021) (0.223) (0.036) (0.351)
Observations 157,202 157,202 135,402 135,402
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 13.55 11.58
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 55.72 56.86
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The baseline specification for
both the investment and credit equations adds controls for initial characteristics of the firm (an identifier
that corresponds to the location of the firm in one of the five quintiles of the distribution of the log
valuation of their total assets in 2002) interacted with the log change in house prices. The estimation
sample includes manufacturing firms that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007;
ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom
housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have outstanding debt with the banking sector. For any
X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t−1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent
variable in columns 1 and 2 is the firm’s yearly investment rate that is measured by the log difference
of the stock of capital between years t− 1 and t measured in real terms. Dependent variable in columns
3 and 4 is the yearly growth rate of firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit
with the banking system in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of
residential housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value
on physical property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its
total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 and 3 report Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimates, and columns 2 and 4 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics
denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous
regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the
first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test
statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero.
Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 14: House Prices and Investment - Small and Medium Firms and Big Municipalities
Dependent variable: Investment
Sample of firms: Small and Medium Firms
Sample of municipalities: >5.000 inhabitants >10.000 inhabitants >50.000 inhabitants
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) OLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.063*** -0.494 -0.082*** -0.886** -0.165*** -0.209
(0.022) (0.383) (0.028) (0.404) (0.047) (3.177)
Tangibility 0.940*** 0.670*** 0.935*** 0.678*** 0.854*** 0.649***
(0.030) (0.046) (0.034) (0.048) (0.052) (0.069)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.175*** 3.028*** 0.218*** 2.968*** 0.491*** 2.889***
Tangibility (0.055) (0.445) (0.073) (0.455) (0.142) (0.671)
Observations 147,129 147,129 125,489 125,489 64,262 64,262
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 9.13 5.89 0.15
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 61.94 56.89 20.00
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes manufacturing firms
that i) have an average employment during the housing boom below 50 employees; and ii) are located in municipalities whose
population in year 2002 exceeds, respectively, a) 5,000 inhabitants; b) 10,000 inhabitants; and c) 50,000 inhabitants. For any
X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t−1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the firm’s
yearly investment rate that is measured by the log difference of the stock of capital between years t − 1 and t measured in
real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and year t.
Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a
firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 2, 4 and 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote
the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on
IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals
zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on
Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 15: House Prices and Credit - Small and Medium Firms and Big Municipalities
Dependent variable: Credit
Sample of firms: Small and Medium Firms
Sample of municipalities: >5.000 inhabitants >10.000 inhabitants >50.000 inhabitants
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) OLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.057** -0.025 -0.054** -0.268 -0.150*** 3.551
(0.022) (0.500) (0.026) (0.483) (0.049) (14.463)
Tangibility 0.241*** 0.098 0.239*** 0.113* 0.183*** 0.114
(0.033) (0.061) (0.036) (0.061) (0.051) (0.189)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.165*** 1.713*** 0.170** 1.549*** 0.400*** 1.621*
Tangibility (0.061) (0.496) (0.071) (0.485) (0.129) (0.920)
Observations 124,216 124,216 105,557 105,557 52,937 52,937
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 8.51 6.06 0.09
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 61.87 60.82 23.68
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes manufacturing
firms that i) have an average employment during the housing boom below 50 employees; and ii) are located in municipalities
whose population in year 2002 exceeds, respectively, a) 5,000 inhabitants; b) 10,000 inhabitants; and c) 50,000 inhabitants.
For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable
is the yearly growth rate of firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit with the banking system in
real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and year t.
Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a
firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1, 3 and 5 report Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 2, 4 and 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote
the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on
IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals
zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on
Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 16: Misallocation at the municipality level
Manufacturing Sector
Dependent variable: Variance of log capital-labor ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Housing Prices) 0.388*** 0.503*** 0.534***
(0.039) (0.053) (0.056)
Observations 35,041 35,039 34,878
Year FE Yes No No
Region-Year FE No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis.
Dependent variable is the log variance in the capital-labor ratio in real terms
in municipality m, industry s and year t. House prices denote the log of the
average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m
and year t. The estimation sample includes all industry-municipality pairs
active in the manufacturing sector in one year over the period 2003-2007.
Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Data Coverage
Table A.1: Employment, Wage Bill and Firms Coverage 2003-2007
(a) Manufacturing Sector
Employment Wage Bill Firms
Panel Data
2003-2007 77.7 85.5 84.6
Annual Data
2003 75.7 86.3 83.2
2004 76.5 86.8 85.2
2005 77.1 85.7 83.1
2006 79.7 85.6 84.5
2007 79.3 82.9 86.9
Note: Each cell corresponds to the coverage, expressed as a percent-
age with respect to the official census, of full-time equivalent employ-
ment, wage-earners remuneration and number of firms, respectively,
of the manufacturing sector in the Bank of Spain (BdE) database rel-
ative to the data publicly reported by the Spanish National Institute
of Statistics (INE). Official data on employment and wage bill come
from Production and Generation of Income Accounts by Branches
of Activity and the number of firms data come from DIRCE Census
on Business that is the one reported in Eurostat Structural Business
Statictics.
Table A.2: Firm Size Distribution by Employment Categories 2003-2007
(a) Manufacturing Sector
0 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 200 ¿ 200
Panel Data
2003-2007 72.9 88.9 90.7 87.5 93.4
Annual Data
2003 68.3 85.6 89.4 87.5 92.1
2004 71.8 87.9 91.8 89.0 90.3
2005 74.3 89.1 90.2 83.3 95.2
2006 73.8 91.4 90.5 85.0 94.9
2007 76.3 90.5 91.5 92.7 94.5
Note: Each cell corresponds to the coverage of the number of firms by employment
size-category, expressed as a percentage with respect to the official census of firms in
that size-category, of the manufacturing sector in the Bank of Spain (BdE) database
relative to the data publicly reported by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics
(INE). Official data on the number of firms come from the DIRCE Census on Business
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Note: Figures compare the yearly average growth rates in the firm-level Bank of Spain (BdE) dataset with respect to the
yearly aggregate growth rates reported in the Production and Generation of Income Accounts by Branches of Activity
from National Accounts as of a) production; b) full-time equivalent employment of wage earners; and c) wage-earners
remuneration, in the manufacturing sector from 2000 to 2013. The micro-aggregates in the BdE dataset are computed
as the sum of firms’ reported, respectively, a) net operating revenue; b) average employment; and c) labor expenditures
(wages and social security contributions). The correlation rate among micro and macro aggregates is 0.91 for employment
and 0.96 for both production and the wage bill.
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B Appendix Figures
Figure B.1: The House Price Boom in Spain. Variation Across Municipalities
























Note: Panels (a) and (c) illustrate the cumulative growth rate from 2003 to 2007 of the average house price index in real
terms for municipalities in the provinces of Barcelona (Panel a) and Madrid (Panel c). Panels (b) and (d) report the
Buildable Urban Land Ratio of a municipality in 1997 in the provinces of Barcelona (Panel b) and Madrid (Panel d).
The Buildable Urban Land Ratio refers to the ratio of potential plot surface over the built urban surface in 1997 in the
municipalities included in the sample. The municipality distribution at province level of the cumulative house price growth
rates and the urban land ratio is divided in quartiles. Larger house price growth rates are reported with more intense red
colors, meanwhile greater urban land supply is reflected with more intense blue colors. Municipalities without information
appear in white, with the label “No data”.
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Note: Correlation between Price Indexes =  0.98
Note: Figures compare the evolution of the residential house price index in nominal terms for Spain from 2000 to
2012, using 2000 as the base year, with the dynamics of the non-residential real estate price indices of a) commercial
buildings; b) industrial plants; c) commercial offices; and d) offices. Data come from the Spanish Ownership Registry
and the Bank of Spain (BdE).
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C Appendix Tables
C.1 House Prices and Local Geographical Conditions
Table C.1 shows that the there is a negative cross-sectional correlation between the ratio of
buildable urban land (computed for different years) and housing price growth across Spanish
municipalities during the housing boom years (2003-2007).
Table C.1: House Prices and Buildable Urban Land
Dependent variable: House Prices Cumulative Growth (2003-2007)
(1) 1995 (2) 1996 (3) 1997 (4) 1998
Buildable Urban Land Ratio -0.014*** -0.016** -0.014** -0.017**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 1,653 1,676 1,683 1,665
R-squared 0.122 0.118 0.118 0.119
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Dependent
variable is the cumulative growth rate of real house prices of residential housing in
municipalities with firms included in the estimation sample during the housing boom
period (2003-2007). Buildable Urban Land Ratio refers to the ratio of potential plot
surface over the built urban surface for the years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 in Spanish
municipalities included in the sample. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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C.2 Additional Robustness Tests
Heterogeneous Responses: Firm Size
We explore the potential heterogeneous responses of investment and credit to local house
price shocks sassociated to firm size. In order to do that, we divide the sample of manufacturing
firms in three subsamples depending on their size as measured by their average employment
during the housing boom. In particular, we label as small firms the firms that have between
1 and 20 employees; as medium firms the ones between 21 and 49 employees; and as large
firms when they have 50 or more employees. The 2SLS estimates reported below in Tables C.2
and C.3 seem to indicate a stronger collateral channel on the segment of medium firms that,
compared to the average response, exhibit significantly larger house price elasticities of both
investment and credit.
Table C.2: Investment and Firm Size
Dependent variable: Investment
OLS 2SLS
(1) Small (2) Medium (3) Large (4) Small (5) Medium (6) Large
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.038** -0.048 -0.089* -0.784** -0.145 -1.218*
(0.017) (0.035) (0.053) (0.329) (0.746) (0.720)
Tangibility 0.951*** 0.890*** 0.620*** 0.664*** 0.539*** 0.438***
(0.030) (0.052) (0.095) (0.048) (0.102) (0.150)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.117*** 0.156* 0.227 3.022*** 4.251*** 2.166*
Tangibility (0.042) (0.087) (0.142) (0.445) (1.015) (1.228)
Observations 136,631 32,278 10,057 136,631 32,278 10,057
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 10.66 3.21 5.25
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 48.99 32.55 6.28
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Firms are divided in three subsamples depending on their
size as measured by their average employment during the housing boom. In particular, we label as Small firms the firms that have
between 1 and 20 employees; as Medium firms the ones between 21 and 49 employees; and as Large firms when they have 50 or
more employees. The estimation sample includes manufacturing firms that i) are active in at least one year in the period 2003-2007;
ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing supply elasticites are
available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in the years included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X
between year t− 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the firm’s yearly investment rate that is measured by
the log difference of the stock of capital between years t − 1 and t measured in real terms. House prices denote the average price
index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on
physical property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported
in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 to 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple
endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient
on HSEm ∗∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage
coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
vi
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 70 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2135
Table C.3: Banking Credit and Firm Size
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Credit)
(1) Small (2) Medium (3) Large (4) Small (5) Medium (6) Large
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.046** -0.042 -0.074 0.144 -0.679 -1.864
(0.021) (0.042) (0.099) (0.511) (0.994) (2.034)
Tangibility 0.267*** 0.158** 0.141 0.138** -0.124 0.009
(0.031) (0.078) (0.144) (0.058) (0.146) (0.260)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.110** 0.150 0.168 1.429*** 3.325*** 1.894
Tangibility (0.051) (0.113) (0.262) (0.478) (1.195) (2.457)
Observations 112,885 29,974 9,188 112,885 29,974 9,188
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 9.32 3.11 4.08
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 46.74 30.60 5.63
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Firms are classified by size depending on their average
number of employees such that Small refers to firms between 1 and 20 employees; MediumFirms are divided in three subsamples
depending on their size as measured by their average employment during the housing boom. In particular, we label as Small firms
the firms that have between 1 and 20 employees; as Medium firms the ones between 21 and 49 employees; and as Large firms when
they have 50 or more employees. The estimation sample includes manufacturing firms that i) are active in at least one year in
the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing
supply elasticites are available; and iii) have outstanding debt with the banking sector. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference
in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of firm’s credit defined
the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit with the banking system in real terms. House prices denote the average price index
in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical
property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s
balance sheet. Columns 1 to 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares
(2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous
regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on
HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage
coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Endogeneity of the tangibility rate
Table C.4 reports estimates of a cross-sectional regression of the firms’ tangibility rate in
2002 on five quintiles of the log valuation of their total assets in 2002, as well as industry-region
fixed effects. Considering the fact that the estimation sample is restricted to manufacturing
firms that have information on the volume of total assets for the year 2002, the estimates show
that the initial level of total assets is a good predictor of the tangibility rate of firms in the
pre-housing boom period. Larger firms, when size is measured in terms of asset value, have
lower tangibility rates.
Table C.4: Predictors of the Tangibility Rate
Dependent variable: Tangibility Rate
(1) 2002
2nd Quintile Ln(Assets 2002) -0.003
(0.003)
3rd Quintile Ln(Assets 2002) -0.001
(0.004)
4th Quintile Ln(Assets 2002) -0.011***
(0.003)




Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level
in parenthesis. Dependent variable is the tangibility rate
in 2002 computed as the share of tangible fixed assets to
total assets. Firms have an identifier that corresponds
to their location in one of the five quintiles of the distri-
bution of the log valuation of their total assets in 2002.
Significance levels: ***p¡0.01, **p¡0.05, *p¡0.1.
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Investment as the change in the Capital-Labor Ratio
We estimate our main specification on the investment equation considering now the log
change in the capital-labor ratio as the dependent variable. The estimates reported in this table
are qualitatively similar to those reported in the main text when using the log difference of the
capital stock as dependent variable (Table 3). In particular, consistent with the theoretical
predictions of the model, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically
significant at 1% in all specifications. These estimates point out an increasing dispersion of the
capital-labor ratio associated to local house price shocks and, thus, they can be considered as a
further evidence on the impact of the collateral channel on capital misallocation.
Table C.5: House Prices and Capital-Labor Ratio
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Capital/Wage Bill)
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.028* -0.030* -0.033* -0.854*** -0.864*** -0.953***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.245) (0.255) (0.318)
Tangibility 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 0.766*** 0.739*** 0.719***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.092** 0.097** 0.102** 2.472*** 2.741*** 2.966***
Tangibility (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.410) (0.430) (0.447)
Observations 186,526 186,526 186,478 186,526 186,526 186,478
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Industry-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 16.35 16.02 10.41
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 45.88 45.57 47.26
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes firms in the non-
financial market economy, excluding the construction and the real estate sectors, that i) are active in at least one year in
the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom
housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in the years included in the sample. For any X,
∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the firm’s
yearly investment rate that is measured by the log difference of the stock of capital over the wage bill between years t− 1 and
t measured in real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m
and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories and equipment)
owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 to 3 report
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics
denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic
on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗∆Rt equals
zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on
Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Robustness to excluding subsidaries of multinational groups
In this table, we exclude from our sample of manufacturing firms the subsidiaries of foreign
multinationals operating in Spain. This can be justified because the investment and credit
decisions of these firms could react differently than domestic companies to specific local demand
shocks and, also, because the decisions of the subsidiaries could be related with the unobserved
collateral value of the multinational group. The results reported below show that OLS and
2SLS estimates on the impact of house prices on both investment and credit are not significantly
affected by the exclusion of these firms that just represent 5% of the estimation sample.
Table C.6: Robustness: sample of domestic manufacturing firms
Sample: Excluding subsidiaries of multinationals
Dependent variable: Investment Credit
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.042*** -0.810*** -0.040** -0.336
(0.016) (0.295) (0.019) (0.404)
Tangibility 0.922*** 0.626*** 0.249*** 0.090
(0.027) (0.046) (0.030) (0.056)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.128*** 3.153*** 0.120** 1.762***
Tangibility (0.038) (0.443) (0.048) (0.459)
Observations 177,246 177,246 150,536 150,536
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 9.82 8.52
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 45.61 42.01
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample
of manufacturing firms excludes the subsidiaries of foreign multinationals operating in Spain.
For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period
2003-2007. Dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the firm’s yearly investment rate that is
measured by the log difference of the stock of capital between years t − 1 and t measured in
real terms. Dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the yearly growth rate of firm’s credit
defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit with the banking system in real terms.
House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality
m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real
estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its total assets in year
t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 and 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimates, and columns 2 and 4 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics
denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple
endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null
hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2
denotes the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient
on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Robustness to clustering of standard errors at different levels
In this table, we depart from our baseline level of clustering (municipality) and we show
our baseline OLS and 2SLS estimates for investment and credit for our preferred specification
with province clustering, two-way clustering by province and sector, and two-way clustering by
municipality and sector. Focusing on the coefficient of the interaction term related with the
main prediction of the model, the standard errors are somewhat larger when we use province
clustering, and very similar or smaller when we use to-way clustering by province and sector and
two-way clustering by municipality and sector. In all cases, the coefficient of interest remains
statistically significant at 1% level.
Table C.7: Robustness to different levels of clustering
Dependent variable: Investment Credit
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.045 -0.760 -0.045 -0.185
Clustering: province (0.018) (0.272) (0.014) (0.409)
Clustering: prov. and ind. (0.012) (0.254) (0.014) (0.313)
Clustering: mun. and ind. (0.011) (0.282) (0.016) (0.353)
Tangibility 0.929 0.631 0.248 0.094
Clustering: province (0.050) (0.043) (0.029) (0.056)
Clustering: prov. and ind. (0.063) (0.064) (0.042) (0.054)
Clustering: mun. and ind. (0.055) (0.066) (0.042) (0.055)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.134 3.181 0.123 1.711
Tangibility
Clustering: province (0.046) (0.504) (0.040) (0.543)
Clustering: prov. and ind. (0.034) (0.373) (0.033) (0.379)
Clustering: mun. and ind. (0.029) (0.319) (0.034) (0.313)
Observations 186,602 186,602 158,477 158,477
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the
period 2003-2007. Dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the firm’s yearly investment
rate that is measured by the log difference of the stock of capital between years t− 1 and t
measured in real terms. Dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the yearly growth rate of
firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit with the banking system in
real terms. House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in
municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion of the book value on physical
property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its
total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 and 3 report Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimates, and columns 2 and 4 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
estimates. The significance level of the coefficient of the interaction term is under 1% for all
the specifications when clustering standard errors at different levels.
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Non-Financial Market Economy
In this subsection, we report the main estimates for the reduced-form equations of investment
and credit considering in the estimation sample all firms that are active in the non-financial
market economy, beyond the firms included in the manufacturing sector. The non-financial
market economy includes all sectors of activity excluding the ones related with the activity of
the public sector (e.g. health, education, public security or administration), mining industries
and the financial activity (e.g. banking or insurance activities). We also exclude from the
sample firms in the construction and real estate sectors. The results on the main investment
and credit estimates reported below are qualitatively robust when including these industries,
suggesting that our main finding on the impact of the collateral channel as a mechanism that
creates capital misallocation could apply to the whole non-market economy.31
Table C.8: House Prices and Investment in the Non-Financial Market Economy
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.478*** -0.581*** -0.619***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.172) (0.187) (0.202)
Tangibility 0.968*** 0.970*** 0.972*** 0.768*** 0.725*** 0.727***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 2.207*** 2.709*** 2.695***
Tangibility (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.238) (0.290) (0.285)
Observations 662,563 662,563 662,388 662,563 662,563 662,388
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Industry-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 12.86 14.78 11.35
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 59.55 56.84 57.31
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes firms in the non-
financial market economy, excluding the construction and the real estate sectors, that i) are active in at least one year in the
period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing
supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in the years included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X)
is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the firm’s yearly
investment rate that is measured by the log difference of the stock of capital between years t− 1 and t measured in real terms.
House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers
to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book
value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 to 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimates, and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer
(SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes
the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero.
Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
31See Almunia, Lopez-Rodriguez and Moral-Benito (2018) for details on the cleaning process and construction
of the database as well as an exhaustive representativeness analysis of this micro dataset with respect to official
statistics of the Spanish economy.
xii
Non-Financial Market Economy
In his subsection, we report the main estimates for the reduced-form equations of i vestment
and credit c nsidering in the s imation sample al firms that are active in e non-financial
market e onomy, beyond the firms included in the manufactur g sect r. The on-financ al
market economy includes all sectors of activity excluding the ones related with the activity of
the ublic sector ( .g. health, education, public security or adminis ration), min g industries
the financial activity ( .g. banking or insurance activities). We also exclude from the
ample firms in the construct on a d r al esta e sectors. The results on the main investmen
and credit esti ates reported below are qualitative y r bust when including these industries,
suggesting that our main finding on the impact of the collateral channel as a mechanism that
creates capital misallocation could apply to the whole non-market economy.31
Table C.8: House Prices and Investment in the Non-Financial Market Economy
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.478*** -0.581*** -0.619***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.172) (0.187) (0.202)
Tangibil ty 0.968*** 0.970*** 0.972*** 0.768*** 0.725*** 0.727***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 2.207*** 2.709*** 2.695***
Tangibility (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.238) (0.290) (0.285)
Observations 662,563 662,563 662,388 662,563 662,563 662,388
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Industry-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 12.86 14.78 11.35
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 59.55 56.84 57.31
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes firms in the non-
financial market economy, excluding the construction and the real estate sectors, that i) are active in at least one year in the
period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom housing
supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in the years included in the sample. For any X, ∆Ln(X)
is the log difference in X between year t − 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the firm’s yearly
investment rate that is measured by the log difference of the stock of capital between years t− 1 and t measured in real terms.
House prices denote the average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers
to the proportion of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book
value of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 to 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimates, and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer
(SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes
the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero.
Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
31See Almunia, Lopez-Rodriguez and Moral-Benito (2018) for details on the cleaning process and construction
of the database as well as an exhaustive representativeness analysis of this micro dataset with respect to official
statistics of the Spanish economy.
xii
Non-Financial Market Economy
In this subsection, we report the main esti ates for the reduced-form equations of investment
and credit considering in the estimation sa ple all firms that are active in the non-financial
arket econo y, beyond the firms included in the manufacturing sector. The non-financial
arket econo y includes all sectors of activity excluding the ones related with the activity of
the public sector (e.g. health, education, public security or administration), mining industries
and the financial activity (e.g. banking or insurance activities). We also exclude from the
sample firms in the construction and real estate sectors. The results on the main investment
and credit estimates reported below are qualitatively robust when including these industries,
suggesting that our main finding on the impact of the collateral channel as a mechanism that
creates c pital misallocation could apply to the whole non-market economy.31
Table C.8: House Prices and Investment in the Non-Financial Market Economy
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.478*** -0.581*** -0.619***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.172) (0.187) (0.202)
Tangibility 0.968*** 0.970*** 0.972*** 0.768*** 0.725*** 0.727***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 2.207*** 2.709*** 2.695***
Tangibility (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.238) (0.290) (0.285)
Observations 662,563 662,563 662,388 662,563 662,563 662,388
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Industry-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 12.86 14.78 11.35
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 59.55 56.84 57.31
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes firms in the non-
financial market economy, excluding the construction and the real estate sectors, that i) are active in at least one year in the
period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities wher both residential house price indices and m asures of pre-boom ousi g
supply elasticites are available; and iii) have positive stock of capital in the years included in the sample. For any X, ∆L (X)
is the log difference in X betwee year t − 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent v riable is the fir ’s yearly
investment rate that is me sured by the log difference of the stock of capital between years t− 1 and t measured in real terms.
House prices denot the average price index in real terms of resid ntial housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers
to the proportion of the book value on physical prop rty (r al estate, f ctories and equipment) ow ed by firm over the book
val e of its total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 to 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimates, and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer
(SW) weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding
test statistic for the ull hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗ ∆Rt equals z r . F-statistic on IV-2 enot s
the corr sponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗∆Rt) equals zero.
Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
31See Almunia, Lopez-R driguez and Moral-Benito (2018) for details on the cleaning process and construction
of the database as well as an exhaustive representativeness analysis of this micro dataset with respect to official
statistics of the Spanish economy.
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Table C.9: House Prices and Banking Credit
Dependent variable: ∆Ln(Credit)
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.020* -0.019 -0.023** 0.181 0.191 0.100
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.318) (0.322) (0.319)
Tangibility 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.286*** 0.175*** 0.173*** 0.183***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.062* 0.057* 0.058* 1.234*** 1.256*** 1.146***
Tangibility (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.233) (0.252) (0.243)
Observations 524,320 524,320 524,140 524,320 524,320 524,140
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Industry-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 10.77 12.43 9.55
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 57.58 54.26 55.99
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes firms in the non-
financial market economy, excluding the construction and the real estate sectors, that i) are active in at least one year in
the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom
housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have outstanding debt with the banking sector. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the
log difference in X between year t− 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of
firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit with the banking system in real terms. House prices denote
the average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion
of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its
total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 to 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates,
and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW)
weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes
the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗ ∆Rt) equals
zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table C.10: Misallocation at the municipality level
Non-Financial Market Economy
Dependent variable: Variance of log capital-labor ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Housing Prices) 0.345*** 0.420*** 0.497***
(0.026) (0.034) (0.037)
Observations 78,987 78,987 78,478
Year FE Yes No No
Region-Year FE No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. De-
pendent variable is the log variance in the capital-labor ratio in real terms
in municipality m, industry s and year t. House prices denote the log of the
average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and
year t. The estimation sample includes all industry-municipality pairs active
in the non-financial market economy in one year over the period 2003-2007.
Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table C.9: House Prices and Banking Credit
Dependent variable: ∆ n(Credit)
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS
∆ Ln(House Prices) -0.020* -0.019 -0.023** 0.181 0.191 0.100
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.318) (0.322) (0.319)
Tangibility 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.286*** 0.175*** 0.173*** 0.183***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031)
∆ Ln(House Prices) × 0.062* 0.057* 0.058* 1.234*** 1.256*** 1.146***
Tangibility (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.233) (0.252) (0.243)
Observations 524,320 524,320 524,140 524,320 524,320 524,140
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes No No
Industry-Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-1 10.77 12.43 9.55
1st Stage F-Stat. on IV-2 57.58 54.26 55.99
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. The estimation sample includes firms in the non-
financial market economy, excluding the construction and the real estate sectors, that i) are active in at least one year in
the period 2003-2007; ii) are located in municipalities where both residential house price indices and measures of pre-boom
housing supply elasticites are available; and iii) have outstanding debt with the banking sector. For any X, ∆Ln(X) is the
log difference in X between year t− 1 and year t for the period 2003-2007. Dependent variable is the yearly growth rate of
firm’s credit defined the log difference of firm’s outstanding credit with the banking system in real terms. House prices denote
the average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and year t. Tangibility refers to the proportion
of the book value on physical property (real estate, factories and equipment) owned by a firm over the book value of its
total assets in year t as reported in firm’s balance sheet. Columns 1 to 3 report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates,
and columns 4 to 6 report Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates. F-statitics denote the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW)
weak identification tests in the presence of multiple endogenous regressors. F-statistic on IV-1 denotes the corresponding
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on HSEm ∗∆Rt equals zero. F-statistic on IV-2 denotes
the corresponding test statistic for the null hypothesis that the first-stage coefficient on Tangimt ∗ (HSEm ∗ ∆Rt) equals
zero. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table C.10: Misallocation t the municipality level
Non-Financial Market Economy
Dependent variable: Variance of log capital-labor ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Housing Prices) 0.345*** 0.420*** 0.497***
(0.026) (0.034) (0.037)
Observations 78,987 78,987 78,478
Year FE Yes o No
Region-Year FE No Yes No
Industry-Region-Year FE No No Yes
Note: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. De-
pendent variable is the log variance in the capital-labor ratio in real terms
in municipality m, industry s and year t. House prices denote the log of the
average price index in real terms of residential housing in municipality m and
year t. The estimation sample includes all industry-municipality pairs active
in the non-financial market economy in one year over the period 2003-2007.
Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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